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Abstract 
The aim of this study was to model the overpressure effects of a vapour cloud explosion from a significant hydrogen 
leakage in a compressor shelter. Modelling was performed with the FLACS software for three different cases: 
Model1, Model2 and Model3. Model1 covered only the compressor shelter, and its surroundings without process 
equipment and buildings. Model2 included the compressor shelter, surrounding diesel producing unit and a control 
building. Model3 included the process area with a radius of 100 metres from the compressor shelter. Each model had 
the same modelling area, computational mesh (grid), and scenario settings in FLACS. 
 
The hydrogen leakage was modelled (dispersion simulation) to examine the effects of two Pasquill weather 
conditions (2F and 5D) and three different wind directions on the formation and dispersion of a vapour cloud. Based 
on the results, the worst case dispersion scenario was chosen for each model. The dispersion scenario with the largest 
flammable vapour cloud (volume and mass) was chosen. Explosion simulations were performed with an equivalent 
stoichiometric gas cloud based on the volume of the conservative Q8 cloud. Explosion simulations were also run with 
Q9 clouds which are less conservative than Q8 clouds. The worst case scenario was selected for each case based on 
the highest overpressure and pressure impulse. Build up overpressures and pressure impulses were measured with 
monitor points located at several places throughout the model (e.g. nearby process area and control building). The 
locations of the monitor points remained the same in each model. 
 
The FLACS software used in this study showed that not only the location of the ignition points and volume of the 
blockage ratio but also the mass of a flammable vapour cloud have a significant effect on the magnitude of the 
explosion overpressures and pressure impulses. The maximum overpressures were measured in the compressor 
shelter in Model2 (4.4 bar(g)) and Model3 (3.7 bar(g)) with pressure impulses of 4770 Pas (Model2) and 4400 Pas 
(Model3). The masses of the flammable vapour clouds were 140 kg in Model2 (cloud volume 7500 m3) and 138 kg in 
Model3 (cloud volume 7400 m3). The maximum values measured at the control building were in Model1 (0.5 bar(g) 
and 1650 Pas) where the mass and volume of the flammable vapour cloud were 160 kg and 8200 m3. 
 
This work also showed that the choice of an equivalent stoichiometric gas cloud has a very significant influence on 
worst case scenario selection since overpressures and pressure impulses varied according to the cloud volume 
(significantly higher overpressure effects in Q8 cloud than in Q9 cloud). A hydrogen vapour cloud explosion in a 
compressor shelter can cause a major accident with severe personal injuries, major equipment and structural damage, 
production interruption and significant financial damage.  
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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
L Characteristic dimension of the geometry 
ṁ Mass flow rate  
P Pressure 
Re Reynolds number 
u Flow velocity 
ν Kinematic viscosity of the fluid  
AIT Auto ignition temperature 
CV Control Volume 
FLAMkg Mass of a flammable vapour cloud  
LFL Lower flammability limit 
MIE Minimum ignition energy 
Q8 Equivalent stoichiometric vapour cloud (for enclosed situations)  
Q9 Equivalent stoichiometric vapour cloud (for well-vented situations)  
UFL Upper flammability limit 
VCE Vapour cloud explosion 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the chemical and petrochemical industries flammable liquids and gases are constantly 
processed and thus a risk of an explosion exists. Explosion Consequences caused by 
flammable vapour clouds are generally destructive and pose a high risk in particular in 
industrial areas. (Pekalski et al. 2005) The severity of a vapour cloud explosion (VCE) 
varies depending on e.g. a fuel, a mass of a flammable vapour cloud and a degree of 
congestion and confinement in the area of a vapour cloud. An explosion in an open 
space does not cause similar overpressures as an explosion occurring in a partly 
confined area. Worst case scenarios are developed to illustrate the existing hazard, 
evaluate the possible consequences and to highlight preventive measures. One way has 
been to use modelling programmes that predict overpressures generated by explosions. 
(Bjerkedvedt et al. 1997) 
The most dangerous vapour cloud explosions occur in the partly confined or confined 
areas where the overpressures can rise to very high measures only in a few milliseconds. 
Modelling of partly confined areas has been challenging as the objects in the area cause 
turbulence. Turbulence is generally a very complex phenomenon that cannot be 
modelled by all software. Programmes suitable for modelling those areas are generally 
very expensive and require a lot of computing power. (Bjerkedvedt et al. 1997) 
In the offshore industry it has already been a long-standing practice to model vapour 
cloud explosions in different areas using Computation Fluid Dynamics (CFD) based 
modelling software. CFD modelling programmes use numerical methods and 
algorithms to analyse problems involving fluid flows. One of the commonly used CFD 
software used in safety analyses is FLACS developed by the Norwegian company 
GexCon. FLACS is used to model dispersions, fires and explosions in both open and 
confined geometries. It is widely used in the oil, gas and process industries. It has a 3D 
feature that enables more accurate predictions of the consequences. (Bjerkedvedt et al. 
1997) 
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The main objective of this study was to model partly confined hydrogen vapour cloud 
explosions in three different models with different volume blockage ratios. The 
modelling was done with FLACS v10.8 software. The preparation of a 3D CAD model 
was made with MicroStation v8i and it was imported to FLACS. Simulations were run 
for dispersions and consequently for vapour cloud explosions. With dispersion 
simulations, the objectives were to estimate  
1. Formed volume of flammable vapour cloud from the flange leak 
2. Masses of the flammable material in formed vapour clouds; 
and with vapour cloud explosion simulations to estimate 
1. Overpressure peaks 
2. Pressure impulse peaks. 
The same case has previously been modelled with PHAST. Software used in Neste 
Engineering Solutions Oy. PHAST is based on analytical methods. It has certain 
limitations that do not make it suitable for simulating partly confined or confined 
explosions with high reliability. The results obtained from FLACS and PHAST are not 
compared in this study. This study focuses on the simulation results of FLACS.  
This study has a theoretical (chapters 1 to 4) and practical part (chapters 5 to 7). The 
theoretical part starts with an introduction of a partly confined vapour cloud explosion. 
The basic concepts and terminology for this study are explained in chapter 2 and chapter 
3 introduces VCEs and review some real cases of hydrogen explosion indidents. The 
FLACS and PHAST are presented in chapter 4. The modelling settings for the FLACS 
simulations are explained in chapter 5, and in chapter 6 the results are shown and 
discussed. The summary of this study with further recommendations is presented in 
chapter 7.   
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2 BASIC CONCEPTS OF THE STUDY  
In order to fully understand this study, the essential terms in the context of consequence 
modelling are explained in this chapter. Although the following terminology is 
commonly used in science as well as in everyday life, there still is a big risk to mix the 
terms with each other and mislead the reader.  
To emphasize the importance of terminology, Keller et al. (2014) have pointed out that 
“Terminology that is not precisely defined and universally understood can lead to 
inappropriate and confusing code development”. In other words, in the worst cases the 
risk can be misinterpreted, misunderstood and analysed wrongly which can lead to 
incident situations and ultimately serious accidents. 
2.1 Combustion 
Combustion is a chemical reaction between a fuel and an oxidant where chemical 
energy is produced and new reaction products are formed (Helmenstine 2017). During 
combustion the weak bindings of molecules break and new strong bindings are formed.  
As a consequence excess binding energy is released that is also known as chemical 
energy. (Raiko et al. 1995) The nature of combustion and the release of chemical energy 
depend on the quantity of fuel involved in the phenomenon, the composition of fuel, and 
the amount of energy transferred. (Mannan 2012) 
The velocity of a combustion reaction (the rate of an energy release) is measured with a 
burning rate. It measures the velocity of the flame front (thin reaction zone) proceeding 
to the unburned mixture immediately ahead of it. Burning rates are determined by the 
transfer processes (e.g. heat and mass transfer) within the flame front and it describes 
the amount of fuel consumed in combustion per unit time [kg/s]. (Bjerketvedt et al. 
1997; Lautkaski 1997) Burning rates can be classified into laminar and turbulent 
burning rates.  
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- The laminar burning rate is the rate at which the laminar (planar) combustion 
wave proceeds relative to the unburned gas mixture ahead of it (Crowl 2003). 
The laminar burning rate of a flammable vapour cloud is considered as a fuel 
reactivity measure. The faster the burning rate the more reactive the flammable 
vapour cloud becomes. (Zalosh 2016) 
- The turbulent burn rate exceeds the burning rate measured under laminar 
conditions to a level that depends on the scale and intensity of turbulence 
(eddies) of unburned gas. (Crowl 2003)  
2.2 Explosion 
An explosion is a sudden and violent release of energy leading to a rapid increase in 
pressure (Lautkaski 1997). The explosion can be either physical or chemical.  
- A physical explosion is caused by the sudden release of mechanical energy (e.g. 
the release of the compressed gas) and it does not involve a chemical reaction. 
Physical explosions can be for example a vessel breakage where mechanical 
energy is released. (Crowl 2003) 
- A chemical explosion requires a chemical exothermic reaction which may be for 
example a combustion reaction. It can occur in the gas, liquid or solid phases. 
(Crowl 2003)  
In this study, the investigated explosion (vapour cloud explosion, described in more 
detail in chapter 3) is a chemical explosion that occurs due to a combustion reaction. It 
may occur if the substance is considered as a flammable material (see section 2.3) and 
certain conditions are fulfilled. The intensity of an explosion is significantly affected by 
for example a fuel, a mass of a flammable vapour cloud and a degree of congestion. 
2.2.1 Release rate of a flammable material 
A Release rate of a flammable material is the velocity of released flammable material 
from the leakage point. The higher the velocity of released fuel the easier it will ignite 
immediately as an ignition source is present. (Javidi et al. 2015) This is due to the fact 
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that a higher velocity of a release rate leads faster to the formation of a flammable 
vapour cloud.  
2.2.2 Delay time of ignition 
The velocity of a fuel release may affect the delay time of ignition. The delay time of 
ignition is a significant factor since the leakage must take some time to form a 
flammable vapour cloud. If the ignition occurs too soon, a flash fire may occur instead 
of a VCE. Therefore, the release rate of a flammable material significantly influences 
the formation of a VCE. (Javidi et al. 2015) 
2.3 Flammable material 
The main properties of a flammable material are the flammability limits, a minimum 
ignition level (MIE) and an auto ignition temperature (AIT). An explosion (in this 
context a chemical explosion) can occur for substances that have certain properties 
which make the materials react in the exothermic reactions. (Crowl 2003) 
2.3.1 Flammability limits 
The flammability limits are one of the major parameters for a flammable vapour cloud. 
The flammability limits are the volumetric concentration of the material in the vapour 
cloud and are expressed as a percentage in the vapour cloud. If a substance has a lower 
flammability limit (LFL) and upper flammability limit (UFL) then it is flammable. The 
determination of flammability limits is not unambiguous; Crowl (2003) mentions the 
following for the determination of flammability limits: “From a practical stand point, 
the American Society for Testing and Fuels (ASTM) defines a fuel mixture with air as 
flammable if the pressure increase during the combustion process is more than 7% of 
the initial pressure”.  If the pressure increase is lower than 7 per cent, the mixture is not 
flammable. 
When the substance concentration is near the flammability limits the burning rate is 
low. (Lautkaski 1997; Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) The flammability limits vary depending 
on the substance as shown in Table 1 for some highly flammable materials.  
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Table 1. The flammability limits of some hydrocarbons, ammonia and hydrogen in air. 
(adapted from Lautkaski 1997) 
Flammable material LFL [vol%] UFL [vol%] 
Hydrogen 4 75 
Ammonia 15 28 
Acetylene 2.5 80 
Methane 5 15 
Ethane 3 12.5 
Propane 2.2 9.5 
Butane 1.9 8.5 
2.3.2 Minimum ignition energy (MIE) 
Minimum ignition energy (MIE) describes the minimum energy that is required to 
initiate the combustion. The lower the MIE value, the easier chemical ignites. (Javidi et 
al. 2015) Table 1 lists MIE values for some hydrocarbons, ammonia and hydrogen in 
air. 
2.3.3 Auto ignition temperature (AIT) 
Auto ignition temperature (AIT) is the minimum temperature required for a flammable 
material to spontaneously ignite in ambient atmosphere without an external source of 
ignition. The fuel is highly flammable when its AIT value is low. (Javidi et al. 2015) 
Table 2 lists AIT values for some hydrocarbons, ammonia and hydrogen in air. 
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Table 2. Values of MIE and AIT for hydrocarbons, ammonia and hydrogen in air. 
(adapted from Lautkaski 1997) 
Flammable material MIE [mJ] AIT [K] 
Hydrogen 0.02 847 
Ammonia 680 924 
Acetylene 0.02 578 
Methane 0.29 813 
Ethane 0.24 788 
Propane 0.25 723 
Butane 0.25 678 
2.4 Blast Wave 
In general, a blast wave is the air wave caused by an explosion (Lautkaski 1997). It is 
observed as a significant pressure increase. The blast wave is a mechanical energy 
which is formed from chemical energy due to the expansion of gaseous fuel products. 
This is caused by the reaction stoichiometry (higher molar amount) and thermal 
expansion. (Ponchaut et al. 2016; Casal 2008) Blast waves can be divided into a shock 
wave, a pressure wave, and a rarefaction wave.  
- A shock wave is an overpressure that reaches the peak value instantly (known as 
detonation). The pressures occurring in the shock waves of explosions can be 
determined as a side-on and reflected pressures. Side-on pressure is a static 
pressure which is behind the shock wave, while reflected pressure is a stagnation 
pressure which is the quantity when the shock wave hits an object, for example a 
wall. (Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) 
- A pressure wave is an overpressure that reaches the peak value gradually 
(known as deflagration). (Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) 
- A rarefaction wave is the gradual decay of the overpressure. (Bjerketvedt et al. 
1997)  
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2.4.1 Overpressure 
The formed overpressure is affected by the combustion and expansion of gases. During 
combustion, the pressure is increasing while in gas expansion it is decreasing. The 
shape of the blast wave (i.e. shock wave and pressure wave) depends on the explosion. 
(Casal 2008) 
During the positive phase (as the pressure increases in combustion), the blast wave may 
collide with objects, resulting in a transient pressure on the object surface. In some 
cases, the overpressure is reflected from the object and forms a local reflected wave. 
This reflected overpressure will vary between two or several times the overpressure of 
the blast wave. (Casal 2008) 
Even though the peak overpressure of the blast wave causes destructive effects, another 
destructive effect is caused by the dynamic pressure. The dynamic pressure consists of 
air movements caused by the blast wave and is proportional to the square of the velocity 
in the air and the density of air behind the blast wave. When the positive phase of the 
pressure curve of a reflected pressure or pressure in a closed system is over the object is 
affected by a blast wind associated with the negative phase. (Casal 2008) Table 3 lists 
the overpressure (blast wave) effects on people, structures and equipment.  
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Table 3. The effects of overpressures on people, structures and equipment. (adapted 
from LaChance et al. 2011; Casal 2008) 
Overpressure ( 
bar(g))  
Description of damage 
Direct effects on people 
0.14 Threshold for eardrum rupture 
0.35-0.60 50% probability of eardrum rupture 
0.70-1.03 90% probability of eardrum rupture 
0.83-1.03 Threshold for lung haemorrhage 
1.38-1.72 50% probability of fatality from lung haemorrhage 
2.07-2.41 90% probability of fatality from lung haemorrhage 
0.48 Threshold of internal injuries by blast 
4.83-13.79 Immediate blast fatalities 
Indirect effects on people 
0.1-0.2 People knocked down by pressure wave 
0.14 Possible fatality by being projected against obstacles 
0.55-1.1 People standing up will be thrown a distance 
0.07-0.14 Threshold of skin lacerations by missiles 
0.28-0.35 50% probability of fatality from missile wounds 
0.48-0.69 100% probability of fatality from missile wounds 
Effects on structures and equipment 
0.01 Threshold for glass breakage 
0.03-0.035 Minor structural damages 
0.05 Minor damages to buildings 
0.07 The roof of storage tanks collapses 
0.1 Some damages of steel structures in buildings 
0.15-0.2 Collapse of unreinforced concrete or cinderblock 
walls. Local serious damages to structures and slight 
damages to industrial buildings and heavy machinery 
0.2-0.3 Collapse of industrial steel frame structure. Breakage 
of oil tanks 
0.30-0.4 Many buildings collapses or are destroyed (except for 
concrete-reinforced buildings designed to withstand 
e.g. earthquakes). Displacement of pipe rack, 
breakage of piping 
0.35-0.5 Ordinary buildings are almost completely destroyed 
0.4-0.55 Collapse of pipe racks 
0.5-0.55 Rail car/ tank trucks crash, 20-30 cm thick brick 
walls collapse 
0.6 Train wagons are destroyed completely 
0.7 Total destruction of buildings; heavy machinery 
damaged 
0.5-1 Displacement of cylindrical storage tank, failure of 
pipes 
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2.4.2 Pressure impulse 
Another parameter that measures the damages of a blast wave is the pressure impulse IP. 
It is a time integral of the local pressure-time curves and its unit is Pascal-second (Pas). 
The pressure impulse is shown in Equation 1. (Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) 
 
 
𝐼𝑃 = ∫ 𝑃 𝑑𝑡
𝑡2
𝑡1
 
In which  
IP is the Pressure impulse [Pas] 
t1-2 is the time interval [s] 
P is the local pressure [Pa] 
(1) 
 
Figure 1 shows a blast wave curve showing both the overpressure peak and the pressure 
impulse areas. As simplified, the pressure impulse is the area within the blast wave 
curve and it determines the duration of the overpressure and its amplitude. 
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Figure 1. Overpressure (y axis) and pressure impulse (orange area) (adapted from 
Bjerkedvedt et al. 1997). 
The impulse takes into account both the pressure and the duration of the pulse and may 
be positive and negative. Both positive and negative pressure impulses are important, 
but in general, a positive impulse evaluates the structural response. Positive pressure 
impulses take pressure and pressure pulse duration into account. The negative pressure 
impulse effect depends on the natural frequency of the structure. “The negative impulse 
can be about 1/3 of the positive impulse phase, but this ratio depends on the layout of 
the geometry where the explosion occurs. The results from gas explosion analyses or 
experimental results are often reported as maximum pressure.” (Bjerkedvedt et al. 
1997) Figure 2 shows the damage levels of pressure impulses together with 
overpressures. 
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Figure 2. Damage levels to brick buildings versus the peak pressure and impulse of the 
blast wave from high explosives. (adapted from Bjerkedtvedt et al. 1997) 
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3 VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSION (VCE)  
A VCE is one of the most significant hazards in the process industry. It is a hardly 
predictable event since vapour cloud can drift away and occur from a distance of the 
leakage point. It can be very destructive depending on the source and chemical 
reactivity. (Mannan 2012; Javidi et al. 2015) When a VCE proceeds, its negative 
impulse grows compared with its positive impulse (see section 2.5). This increases the 
negative overpressure rapidly and makes it difficult to predict the pressure of a blast 
wave from VCE. (Casal 2008) Despite the numerous studies and practical experiment, a 
VCE is still not a fully understood phenomenon. For example, the exact propagation of 
a VCE is still a non-predictable event. (Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) 
Figure 3 shows the formation of flammable vapour clouds from gaseous and liquid 
leakage source. 
 
Figure 3. Jet release and evaporating pool (adapted from Bjerketvedt et al. 1997). 
A turbulent momentum jet is formed by an undesirable gaseous leakage. In case of a 
liquid leakage, an evaporating pool is generated (as seen in Figure 3). (Lautkaski 1997) 
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In this study, the main focus is on VCE formed from a gaseous release in a partly 
confined area.  
If a gaseous leakage occurs in a partly confined area, the jet results in a flow circulation 
(see figure 3). The concentration of the vapour cloud in the area increases until it 
reaches a steady state value determined by the gas flow rate and ventilation rate. If the 
formed vapour cloud is within its flammability limits and is ignited, a VCE occurs. 
(Laukaski 1997) 
The consequences of a VCE are highly dependent for example on the surrounding 
environment since the concentration of a flammable vapour cloud varies between partly 
confined and unconfined areas. Partly confined spaces lead to more severe 
consequences since the burning rate increases much rapidly than in more open spaces. 
(Casal 2008; Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) 
VCEs in unconfined areas usually do not cause high overpressures, and it is likely that a 
flash fire occurs instead of VCE. Even small obstacles can be crucial factors for the 
flame acceleration to increase. This was proved in 2005 in England, Buncefield oil 
storage terminal when a massive VCE occurred in relatively unconfined area. Figure 4 
shows the Buncefield terminal area before and after the explosion and massive fire. 
21 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Buncefield terminal area before (upper fig.) the VCE occurred (Institution of 
Chemical Engineers 2017) and during the VCE occurred (lower fig.) (Denton 2015). 
An overfilling protection of a gasoline tank failed and gasoline began to leak on the tank 
roof. Flammable vapour cloud heavier than air formed with a radius of about 250m. 
When the vapour cloud ignited, a strong VCE occurred, which first started as a 
deflagration, but as proceeding also detonation-to-deflagration transition occurred (more 
detailed description of explosion type in section 3.3). Due to a low degree of congestion 
(as seen in Figure 4), high overpressures and fast flame acceleration were unpredictable 
consequences. (Institution of Chemical Engineers 2017) GexCon together with Total 
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Petrochemicals began to investigate the accident more closely. The study found that 
there was a high density of vegetation (bushes and trees) in the area, which caused a 
significant degree of congestion and thus turbulence. The effect of trees on high 
overpressure and flame acceleration was simulated by FLACS, and it was found that 
overpressures of up to 10 bars were measured with the presence of trees, while 
simulations without trees showed relatively low overpressures of about 0.1 bars. (Davis 
et al. 2010) 
A VCE requires different factors in order to occur. The main factors are a congested 
area, an ignition point, a fuel source, (Jeavidi et al. 2015) and the mass of a flammable 
material in a vapour cloud. The volumes of vapour cloud are different depending on the 
area, which affect the combustion reaction and thus to the burning rate. For instance, 
when a vapour cloud ignites in a wide-open area the generated overpressure may be 
negligible. Instead of an explosion, a flash fire occurs which is not as destructive as a 
VCE. (Tauseef et al. 2011; Javidi et al. 2015)  
The delay time of ignition significantly affects whether or not an explosion occurs. If a 
vapour cloud is ignited shortly after its formation, a jet fire is the most likely to occur 
than an explosion. A delay time is required to form a large flammable vapour cloud. 
(Casal, 2008)  
In addition to the location of an ignition source, the delay time is also affected by the 
factors of the flammable material itself. These factors are MIE, AIT, the release rate of a 
flammable material, and flammability limits, which were explained in section 2.3. 
Javidi et al. (2015) have pointed out that MIE, AIT, and release rate of a flammable 
material can speed up the ignition. Flammability limits, the release rate of a flammable 
material, and location of an ignition source can delay the ignition. When conditions are 
fulfilled and a vapour cloud is ignited, according to Casal (2008), “The overall energy 
released will be a function of the amount of flammable substance involved in the 
explosion and its explosion energy, although only a relatively small part of this energy 
will be used to create the blast.” The VCE can be categorised into deflagration, 
detonation, and deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT) depending on the intensity 
of the formed blast wave.  
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3.1 Deflagration 
Deflagration is a vapour cloud explosion with less severe overpressure effects than in a 
detonation. Deflagrations are characterized by a blast wave that propagates at subsonic 
velocity (300 m/s at 0 
o
C). Deflagration is the most common ‘explosion type’ for VCEs 
since the volume of a vapour cloud is usually large enough that the homogeneity of a 
vapour cloud is not high enough for fast chemical reaction resulting in a slow energy 
rate. (Casal 2008; Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) 
Deflagration starts typically as a laminar flow with a relatively low flame speed (1-10 
m/s) and overpressure. The flame front propagates due to molecular heat and mass 
diffusion (Hansen et al. 2016; Mannan 2012). However, the interaction between the 
flow and obstacles in the surrounding area increases the flow speed (burning rate). This 
affects the flame front that has a cellular structure showing the peaks and troughs of the 
flame, also known as wrinkles. The interaction increases the wrinkles of the flame 
causing the higher reaction rate. Consequently, the heat and mass diffusion increases 
and a turbulent flow ahead of the flame front is generated where the flame speed can be 
in order of 100 to 1000 m/s. (Hansen et al. 2016; Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) 
3.2 Detonation 
A detonation is a severe explosion where the blast wave propagates through the 
unreacted vapour cloud at supersonic velocity. A flame front and a shock wave together 
propagate at supersonic velocity and generate greater overpressure than in deflagration. 
(Casal 2008) According to Bjerketvedt et al. (1997) the average burning velocity in a 
detonation is between 1500 and 2000 m/s and the peak pressure between 15 and 20 bars.  
Compared with a deflagration a detonation requires much more energy to create a shock 
wave, and thus it is not likely to occur in a VCE. It is more likely that a VCE first starts 
as a deflagration and then proceeds into a detonation due to the formation of turbulence. 
This is also known as deflagration-to-detonation transition, which will be discussed in 
more detail in section 3.3. However, in confined spaces where the expansion area is 
limited, the VCE can occur directly as a detonation. (Casal, 2008) 
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Depending on the propagation of a VCE a detonation can occur in two different types: 
as a stable or an unstable detonation. A stable detonation occurs in a closed system, 
which has no significant variation in velocities and pressure. An unstable detonation 
occurs in the transition phase of a deflagration-to-detonation where there is no constant 
burning rate and the pressure is higher than in a stable detonation. (Zhang et al. 2011) 
For both deflagration and detonation the pressure curves can be presented as an 
idealized triangle pulses. The time required for a growing overpressure is dependent on 
the explosion force. In general, the stronger the explosion the shorter the required time 
for an increase in overpressure.  
Typically, the pressure growing time is from 50 to 100 milliseconds in deflagrations and 
a few milliseconds in detonations. (Hansen et al. 2016) Figure 5 presents the pressure 
curve for both deflagration and detonation.  
 
Figure 5. The blast wave curves of deflagration (left) and detonation (right) (adapted 
from Ponchaut et al. 2016) 
At the beginning of the curve, the pressure is at ambient pressure, and during the 
explosion the overpressure increases almost instantly. The pressure increase is different 
for deflagrations and detonations; this is due to the chemical reaction speed. After the 
peak pressure, the pressure decreases less rapidly to the negative value, under-pressure, 
and finally increases back to the ambient value. (Casal 2008; Ponchaut et al. 2016) 
Sometimes the curve forms a slightly deformed letter N, known as an N wave, when the 
final pressure recovery appears as a second shock wave (Zalosh 2016). 
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In real situations, the behaviour of a blast wave can differ from the ideal blast wave 
curve (as seen in Figure 5) depending on the explosive fuel. In detonations, high 
explosives (e.g. TNT) are much more likely to follow the ideal blast wave curve. While 
in deflagrations, the blast wave is likely to follow the ideal blast wave curve only from 
the edge of the VCE. This is due to the volume of flammable material in the cloud, 
which is smaller in detonation and the energy release rate, which lower in deflagration.  
(Casal 2008) 
3.3 Deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT) 
A deflagration-to-detonation transition (DDT) is a common initiating mechanism for 
detonations in a VCE of highly flammable materials such as hydrogen. In this type of 
explosions, the produced energy at the beginning in combustion is not high enough to 
produce a shock wave and therefore strong deflagration is generated instead. (Casal 
2008) The flame front creates pressure waves which precompresses and preheats the 
unburned gas ahead of the flame. This generates the shock wave front and a turbulent 
flame brush. The formed turbulent brush strengthens the formed shock waves, makes 
them collide, and forms a united shock front. (Mannan 2012) DDT is a well-understood 
phenomenon, however the conditions for a DDT to occur are not fully understood and 
therefore it is a hardly predictable event. (Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) 
3.4 VCE in partly confined area 
Vapour cloud explosions may occur in areas that are partly confined. Partly confined 
areas are restricted for example with walls, buildings or congested obstacles. In these 
areas, the flame can be accelerated only in certain directions, for example through 
ventilations. Partly confined areas are for example rooms, congested process areas, and 
compressor shelters which are the particular interest of this study. In the case of 
buildings, overpressure escapes generally through the emergency ventilation if the 
constructions stand the formed overpressures and pressure impulses (seen Figure 6). 
(Bjerketvedt et al. 1997: Schiavetti et al. 2018)  
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Figure 6. VCE in partly confined area (adapted from Bjerketvedt et al. 1997). 
Due to the partly confined area and the degree of congestion caused by objects, 
turbulence is formed ahead of the flame, which greatly increases the pressure (see 
Figure 7). In some cases, the filling ratio of 30 to 50 per cent vapour cloud can cause the 
same explosion pressure as the 100 per cent filling ratio of vapour cloud in area that has 
significantly smaller degree of congestion in area due to the expansion of the burned 
gas. This expansion pushes the unburned vapour cloud ahead of the flame and causes 
the air or vapour cloud to thrust out of the room. (Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) As the VCE 
in partly confined area is studied and simulated in this study, the main parameters 
affecting the explosion are more thoroughly discussed in the following sections. 
 
Figure 7. Effects of objects on turbulence formation (adapted from Bjerketvedt et al. 
1997). 
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3.4.1 Effects of ventilation to buildings 
The overpressure generated by the VCE in partly confined area is generally affected by 
two factors: flame, which increases pressure and ventilation, which decreases 
overpressure. The explosion is affected mainly by the burst of the vent and the venting 
of the combustion product. Activation of the venting suddenly changes the flow field in 
the combustion area. The interaction between the flow and the flame extension 
increases and the acceleration of the gases (both burned and unburned) towards the 
ventilation zone increases. (Schiavetti et al. 2018)  If the venting is non-existent or too 
weak and an explosion occurs, considerable overpressure can be achieved even at a low 
combustion rate. (Lautkaski 1997; Bjeketvedt et al. 1997) 
The location of the ignition source has a significant effect on the increasing flame 
acceleration, since the flame generated by the explosion flows towards the venting area. 
If vent openings are located at a distance from the ignition source, then the pressure 
increases as the flame reaches towards the vent. It should also be taken into account that 
there are usually objects in the rooms that increase turbulence and burning rate. 
(Lautkaski 1997; Bjeketvedt et al. 1997) 
There are different types of ventilations. The best ventilation option for an explosion is 
open ventilation but it is not the most practical option for other factors such as the 
weather and fire safety. Thus, the vent openings are covered and installed to open at low 
pressure (in order to reduce the explosion pressure as quickly as possible). The most 
common vent openings are explosion relief panels, explosion relief doors, and rupture 
diaphragms. (Lautkaski 1997; Bjeketvedt et al. 1997) 
Often, vent openings are designed to open at the same pressure and therefore they 
practically open simultaneously, allowing the venting of both unburned mixture and hot 
combustion products. When the flame reaches the venting area, the combustion product 
starts to flow through the vents, whereby the flame acceleration decreases. In addition, 
the volumetric flow rate of exiting vapour cloud drastically decreases due to the 
increased of the vented gas (Schiavetti et al. 2018). The velocity of the flow through the 
vent is increased due to the difference in supersonic velocity between the combustion 
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product (~900 m/s, average velocity for combustion products) and the vapour cloud 
(~340 m/s, average velocity for vapour cloud). Figure 8 shows the effect of early phase 
venting on turbulence formation. (Lautkaski 1997; Bjeketvedt et al. 1997) 
Figure 8. Early phase venting of hot combustion product (adapted from Bjerketvedt et 
al. 1997). 
3.4.2 Effects of obstacles 
Congestion caused by objects significantly increases flame acceleration. When the 
flame front reaches the obstacle, it folds (as seen in Figure 9) and thus the flame front 
surface area increases resulting in a higher reaction rate. As the flame advances, part of 
the vapour cloud is pushed forward due to obstacles generating turbulence. The number 
of obstacles, their arrangement and the shape of the obstacles significantly influence the 
formation of the flame front fold. (Lautkaski 1997; Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) 
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Figure 9. Flame folding caused by the objects (adapted from Lautkaski 1997). 
It has been discovered that round shaped objects form less turbulence than sharp shaped 
objects. This is due to the turbulence intensity that is much smaller with round-shaped 
objects. If there are several objects in a line, the flames and burn rate will increase after 
each object affecting the increased turbulence formation. This significantly increases the 
flame acceleration. (Lautkaski 1997; Bjerketvedt et al. 1997) 
The number of objects in relation to the flow can be estimated by the blockage ratio and 
the volume blockage ratio. The blockage ratio is the total area of obstacles relative to 
the cross section of the vessel, room or process area. It is an important parameter when 
estimating flame acceleration (the higher the value, the stronger the acceleration). The 
volume blockage ratio is the total volume of objects relative to the total volume of the 
room. However, the blockage ratio does not take into account the arrangement of the 
obstacles, which is also a very important factor in case of flame acceleration. Studies 
have shown that small objects in a partly confined area cause greater overpressure 
during an explosion than one larger object with the same blockage ratio. (Lautkaski 
1997) 
Figure 10 shows the effect of arrangement to the overpressure formation during an 
explosion.  
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Figure 10. Influence of obstacle arrangements on flame propagation (adapted from 
Bjerketvedt et al. 1997). 
As seen from Figure 10, the arrangement of objects is a very essential factor for flame 
acceleration. The distance between objects can decrease or increase the flame front. If 
the distance between two objects is sufficient, then continuous flame acceleration is not 
possible. If the distance is negligible, then the so-called “pocked” of unburned mixture 
formed between the objects is too small to cause flame acceleration. (Lautkaski 1997) 
The location of vent openings must be taken into account when arranging the objects. If 
an explosion occurs, then the resulting flame flow will proceed towards the vents. When 
the flame flow progresses, the burning rate increases due to turbulence and according to 
how far the ignition point is from the vent openings. In order to minimize the formation 
of turbulence, it is the most sensible to arrange the objects in such way that their longest 
side or diameter is parallel to the flow direction. In addition, it is very important that 
objects are not arranged in the immediate vicinity of the vents, since the flame rate is at 
its highest value, and that objects are not placed in a queue sequentially. (Bjerketvedt et 
al. 1997; Lautkaski 1997) Figure 11 shows the better and worse arrangement of objects. 
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Figure 11. Better and the worse arrangement of obstacles. In option a. the different 
layout arrangements in a room and in b. the repeated obstacles in relation to the vent 
opening (adapted from Lautkaski 1997). 
3.4.3 Shape of a compartment of building 
Room shape effects significantly on the ventilation and this was proved by the Bauwens 
and Dorofeev (2014) study. The area and especially the height of a room significantly 
affect the overpressure peak of an explosion. The peak overpressures formed from 
hydrogen explosions were simulated for three rooms of different surface area with and 
without ventilation. During the study, the room height was changed from 8 metres to 12 
metres while keeping the other room dimensions constant, the ventilation area was the 
same size in each room. In higher rooms, the peak pressures were lower as the overall 
volume of the rooms were bigger and the flame acceleration was not accelerating the 
same way as in the smaller rooms due to less contact of obstacles.  This proves that the 
total volume of the room has a significant effect on the explosion behaviour. The 
ventilation depends on the volume of the room since the ventilation rate is determined 
by the volume of the room (Bauwens & Dorofeev 2014). 
However, if the room is congested with objects, then the flame propagation is 
determined by the objects and the shape of the room is a less important factor. 
(Lautkaski 1997) There are three principles to apply when optimising the shape of a 
room (Lautkaski 1997): 
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1. The ignition source must be as close as possible to the venting area, in order to 
achieve an early phase of explosion venting. 
2. The flame must propagate in spherical form as long as possible. A spherical 
form is usually formed when the ignition occurs in the centre of the vapour 
cloud. The flame propagates in spherical form only at the initial stage of an 
explosion before the flame front touches the walls or other obstacles and flame 
front begins to “wrinkle” and flame starts to accelerate.  
3. The obstacles must be arranged in a way that a strong turbulence in unburned 
mixture and long flame front are avoided. 
3.5 Review of hydrogen explosion incidents  
VCE is one of the most common incidents with catastrophic consequences such as the 
fatalities and complete destruction of buildings. From the 1940s to the 2010s in total of 
174 VCE worldwide accidents have been reported in chemical process areas. Cases 
have shown that VCE accidents can occur in all areas of hazardous chemical processes 
such as preparation, utilization, storage, and transportation. (Zhu et al. 2017) The 
biggest risk factors for most of the VCE cases have been found to be leakages and 
mechanical failures (Nolan 2011). 
Based on Nolan (2011) all accidents are preventable. It is important that incidents are 
investigated by experts who then prepare a public report - a lessons learned report and 
create new standards. Malfunctions and mistakes leading to incidents must be learned 
and prevented in the future by adding the necessary security features. Since the 
objective of this study is the hydrogen VCE in the refinery area, the following sections 
briefly describe hydrogen VCE and gas explosions in chemical process plants.  
3.5.1 Hydrogen VCE in the Silver Eagle Refinery, US (2009) 
On the 4
th
 of November a massive explosion and fire occurred in the Silver Eagle 
Refinery. The explosion damaged over 100 nearby homes. Fortunately there were no 
fatalities. Four workers were working near the unit when the explosion occurred. They 
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were blown down by the blast wave but they were not badly injured. (Exponent Failure 
Analysis Associates 2013) 
The explosion occurred during the regeneration of the catalyst hot in which hydrogen 
rich gas was used. During the regeneration, the operating temperature increased 
approximately from 370 °C to 427 °C. A 10-inch pipe located at the bottom of the 
reactor in the Mobil distillate dewaxing unit suddenly ruptured completely and a 
relatively small amount of hydrogen rich gas (approximately 100 kg) was released. The 
gas was immediately ignited and exploded. The result was a pressure wave that 
damaged more than 100 homes. During the accident investigation, it was found that the 
ruptured pipe was very thin due to corrosion and that no corrosion studies had been 
carried out on that pipe. (Exponent Failure Analysis Associates 2013) 
3.5.2 Hydrogen gas explosion in an ammonia plant, Norway (1985) 
In the summer of 1985, a serious hydrogen explosion occurred at an ammonia plant in 
Norway. Three people were seriously injured in the accident, two of whom died later. 
The building where the explosion took place was completely destroyed, the windows 
broken down at a distance of 700 metres from the explosion, and concrete blocks of 1.2 
kilogram (part of the building wall) flew up to 16 metres. According to Bjerketvedt & 
Mjaavatten (2015) the accident is one of the largest industrial hydrogen explosion 
reported. 
The initial cause of the accident was the blow out of the water pump seal. The pump fed 
water into a tank containing hydrogen gas at a pressure of 30 bars. This pressure caused 
backflow of water through the pump and the failed seal. The hydrogen leaked inside a 
building, where the water pump was located, lasted 20 to 30 seconds and delayed 
ignition caused an explosion. The total weight of the leaked hydrogen was estimated to 
be 10 to 20 kg. The ignition source is assumed to a hot bearing. (Bjerketvedt & 
Mjaavatten 2015) 
The main explosion was very violent and it is likely that the explosion occurred as a 
detonation. It is estimated that 3.5 to 7 kg of hydrogen burned in the explosion. The roof 
of the building rose by about 1.5 metres before it fell down. A 350-millimetre diameter 
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pipe with 65 to 95 per cent hydrogen gas was attached to the roof. As the roof rose to 
the air the hydrogen pipe burst resulting in a large about 50-metres long jet fire which 
lasted for 30 seconds. (Bjerketvedt & Mjaavatten 2015) 
3.5.3 Hydrogen gas explosion at Danisco Sweeteners Oy, Kotka mill, Finland 
(2004) 
In a xylose hydrogenation plant, Danisco Sweeteners Oy, an explosion occurred on the 
13
th
 of January 2004. During maintenance work, a hydrogen explosion occurred in a 
hydration reactor when the reactor mixer was lifted up. Three maintenance workers got 
burns and hearing damages and six other employees got hearing damage. The explosion 
caused damage also to a lightweight wall. (Aarnivuo & Vauhkonen 2004) 
Four person maintenance team did the maintenance work of the reactor. Three of them 
were working next to the reactor and one at a lower level. At the lower level of the 
reactor space there were two welders working. There was also a working group of two 
vocational school students and a tutor on the ground level. The reactor flange and mixer 
were lifted and moved slightly to the side. During the transfer, the mixer bumped to a 
flange panel, which caused a peeling of a dried nickel catalyst from the flange and 
mixer. At the same time, employees saw a flash followed by an explosion. (Aarnivuo & 
Vauhkonen 2004) 
The accident was primarily caused by the fact that the hydrogenation process was not in 
a safe state when the reactor maintenance was started. The instructions for preparation 
work were not given sufficiently. Firstly, a supervisor gave instructions orally and after 
that wrote them in the so called black book located in a control building. Secondly, he 
did not mention in the book about nitriding which is an essential phase during 
preparation work. The supervisor was not present during preparation and maintenance 
work. In addition, the supervisor made a miscalculation with the nitriding by assuming 
it was done. (Aarnivuo & Vauhkonen 2004) Also the change of shifts affected that the 
preparation work was done by several employees and the communication was not 
sufficient.  
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A flammable hydrogen-air mixture was formed at the latest when the maintenance 
workers opened the reactor flanges. The ignition of the hydrogen-air mixture was 
probably caused by a Raney nickel catalyst that glows when it is dry, or possibly due to 
a mechanical spark. (Aarnivuo & Vauhkonen 2004) 
3.5.4 Explosion at a Finnish Chemicals Oy Äetsä mill, Finland (2005) 
At a fine chemical factory, Finnish Chemicals Oy, an explosion occurred on the 31
st
 of 
October 2005. A process operator was opening a blockage in a connecting pipe between 
a drier and a melting pan. The operator heard anomalous sounds and ran to the 
emergency stop device. As soon as he left the process space an explosion occurred. 
There was no personal injury but the operation was interrupted for a long time causing 
property damage. (Salomäki et al. 2005) 
An unexpected and fierce chemical reaction caused the gas formation and pressure rise 
in the dryer. The discharged pressure from the dryer launched the dryer mixer and the 
engine through the roof. As a consequence, a fire occurred at the end of the exhaust pipe 
of the hydrogen line. It was seen far away. The fire was extinguished in about 20 
minutes. The discharged hydrogen gas caused an explosive fire also inside the building. 
The discharged pressure damaged all lightweight walls inside the building. (Salomäki et 
al. 2005) 
The cause of the event was the use of water to open the blockage in the connecting pipe. 
The use of water first led to an increase in pressure in the melting pan and then in the 
dryer. There were several events that contributed to the accident. The bottom valves of 
the dryer were open, for example, whereby a large amount of product (Sodium 
borohydride powder) had accumulated in the dryer. When the powder reacted with 
water, it caused a rapid increase in heat and pressure in the washer. Amine had 
accumulated in the dryer, as the exhaust pipe was fed with nitrogen and blocked. Thus 
the amine was not obtained from the purified dryer. When the product reacted with the 
carbonates and amines there was a strong gas formation that was mostly hydrogen. 
(Salomäki et al. 2005) 
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4 MODELLING OF PARTLY CONFINED EXPLOSIONS 
Modelling and scaling of consequences are based on different methods such as 
analytical, experimental and computational methods (Skjord et al. 2018). VCEs have 
been studied both experimentally and by modelling. Although practical experimentation 
is the best way to observe a possible accident, and the result is reliable, it is time 
consuming, expensive and challenging to implement (certain conditions, such as the 
right wind velocity and direction, must be realised). Modelling tools on the other hand 
are more cost-effective, time-saving, and to some extent convenient compared with field 
experiments. (Ponchaut et al. 2016) Some models have been developed to predict the 
intensity of pressure waves but most commercial models are based on the theory of 
explosives where the parameters need to be adjusted to evaluate the consequences of a 
VCE (Dobashi et al. 2011). The purpose of this chapter is to explain the basics of 
explosion modelling as well as introduce the modelling programs PHAST (analytical 
modelling) used in Neste Engineering Solutions Oy and FLACS (CFD modelling) used 
in this study.  
In general, analytical modelling is mathematical modelling. The modelling is based on a 
variety of collected data and it can be applied to various disciplines such as natural 
science, engineering, and social science. With the collected data it is possible to 
calculate certain features which enable to predict certain causes. (Caliri 2000) 
Analytical modelling is generally a cost efficient method and the modelling is relatively 
fast against CFD. 
“Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) is a branch of fluid mechanics that uses 
numerical methods and algorithms to solve and analyse problems that involve fluid 
flow, with or without chemical reactions.” (Gexcon AS 2018) CFD software can be 
applied to various disciplines from process industries to civil engineering and 
biomedical science. Despite the fact that CFD software can be used in a wide variety of 
disciplines and can model complex phenomena they are in general very expensive and 
require sufficient computing power. (Tu et al. 2013) 
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Fire and explosion phenomena are theoretically well understood; the principles of 
governing equations for turbulent fluid flows and chemical reactions are well known. 
Modelling helps better identify how a particular fire and explosion phenomenon is 
likely to behave and what are the potential consequences and damages. (Skjord et al. 
2018) 
4.1 Process Hazard Analysis Software (PHAST) 
PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis Software) is one of the most comprehensive process 
industry risk analysis software based on analytical modelling. The software can be used 
for modelling dispersion, fires and explosions. (Pandya et al. 2008; Witlox 2010) 
PHAST is popular especially in Europe (Pöyry 2018) and it is used in versatile ways in 
maritime, oil and gas, and power and renewables industries (DNV GL 2019a). In 
Finland, the tool is used by many large companies such as Neste Engineering Solutions 
Oy and Pöyry Oy Finland. PHAST is tailored for consequence modelling based on 
standards and authority recommended methods. With PHAST, the modelling is 
relatively fast and cost-effective (compared with CFD models, see section 4.2 for 
details). (Pöyry 2018) Although PHAST is a versatile, cost-effective and relatively fast 
modelling program, it has limitations. PHAST is not suitable for modelling confined 
areas. PHAST have simple 3D feature enabling the explosion modelling but it does not 
have a 3D dispersion modelling.  
In this study, the modelling dispersions and explosions occurred in a partly confined 
area (compressor shelter); whereby the PHAST is not the most suitable software (the 
reliability of accumulation modelling of hydrogen gas is not reached). Therefore, 
instead of the PHAST, it was decided to use the FLACS modelling software based on 
the CFD method. FLACS is specifically tailored to model industrial leakage, fire and 
explosion scenarios with 3D capability and can be applied to model enclosed spaces. 
4.2 Flame Acceleration Simulator (FLACS) 
FLACS is a CFD modelling tool tailored to safety applications. It is used to model 
dispersions, fires and explosions in both open and confined geometries. (Gexcon AS 
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2018) FLACS is widely used in the oil, gas and process industries, and the software has 
also been applied in the nuclear industry. FLACS has a 3D feature that enables more 
accurate predictions of the consequences, as FLACS takes into account, among others  
confinement and congestion in the geometry, ventilation and dewatering. (Gexcon 
2018) 
FLACS was originally developed for VCE modelling, and at a later stage, the dispersion 
modelling was also added to the software. With FLACS it is possible to model different 
dispersion and explosion flows such as the dispersions of dissolved chemicals, 
homogeneous gas mixtures, and suspension of solid particles. (Gant & Hoyes 2010) 
In this study, a FLACS (v10.8) was chosen to model a hydrogen vapour cloud 
explosion. The choice was based on FLACS being able to model explosions occurring 
in the confined and partly confined areas. Also FLACS takes the geometry carefully 
into account, which is not possible with PHAST. In addition, Neste Engineering 
Solutions Oy was interested in testing the usability of the software in a consequence 
analysis. It is, however, important to take account that the preparation of a 3D CAD 
model for the FLACS modelling requires significant amount of time and 3D modelling 
expertise. Nevertheless the results obtained from FLACS give a more detailed 
description of the modelled area than what is obtained with PHAST. Table 4 shows a 
comparison of two different models. 
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Table 4. Comparison of two different models (PHAST vs. FLACS). 
 PHAST (7.2) FLACS (v10.8) 
Applicability Dispersion, fires and 
explosions 
Dispersion, fires and 
explosions 
Advantages Simple and relatively fast 
modelling 
Cost-effective 
Based on standards and 
authority recommended 
methods 
 
A 3D feature that allows to 
make more accurate 
predictions for the 
consequences 
Possible to model in open 
and confined geometries. 
Results give a more 
detailed description of the 
modelled area 
The results are not based 
on for example on the 
average volume blockage 
ratio, but on a model that 
takes into the account 
accurate geometry of the 
space. 
 
Disadvantages Not suitable for modelling 
confined areas  
A detailed description of 
the surrounding 
environment is not 
possible 
Labour-consuming: the 
preparation of a 3D CAD 
model for the FLACS 
modelling requires 
significant amount of time 
and 3D modelling 
expertise 
Long simulation times  
Expensive software 
licence 
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5 DESCRIPTION OF THE FLACS MODELLING FOR A 
HYDROGEN VCE IN A COMPRESSOR SHELTER 
The aim of chapter 5 is to present the method of dispersion and explosion CFD 
simulations done with FLACS. The selected modelling area is a compressor shelter and 
its surroundings located in a diesel producing unit. Objects located within a radius of 
100 metres from the compressor shelter were selected for this study (see Figure 12). The 
selected radius covers the control building and the process area including a compressor 
shelter of two piston compressors and one centrifugal compressor. In this study, the 
dispersion modelling was modelled from one piston compressor (flange leakage) and 
leaked gas was assumed to be 100% hydrogen.  
 
Figure 12. Modelling area. 
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5.1 Compressor shelter 
The compressor shelter is a part of the unit and it protects the compressors and related 
equipment from various environmental factors such as wind, snow, heat and rain. It 
includes an operating platform as well as lifting equipment, which is generally used for 
maintenance. (Panchal 2014)  
The design and implementation of a compressor shelter depends on the overall 
arrangement, operation, maintenance and safety of the compressor. The general 
arrangement of the compressor is provided by the vendor. Compressors can be installed 
either on a grade or on a table top depending on the type of compressor. The shelter has 
to cover the compressor and its auxiliary systems including supporting arrangements. 
Also, it has to accommodate the supporting structures and lifting equipment. (Piping 
Engineering 2018) 
In this study, hydrogen dispersion and VCE modelling were done in the compressor 
shelter and in its immediate surroundings. The compressor shelter has a volume of 9528 
m
3
 and a wall material of corrugated sheet. The shelter has an opening on the east side 
and it is open all around from the bottom (1.2 metres) and on the top of the long sides 
there are ventilation gratings.  
Climatic conditions affect how compressor shelters shall be built. In warm climates, 
where there is no significant rainfall, the compressor shelter may be partially covered. 
In such cases it is sufficient for the compressor shelter to have a roof and side curtains. 
These protect the compressors from direct sunlight and rainfall. In rainy and cold 
climates the building must be covered with cladding. (Piping Engineering 2018) 
From a safety point of view the compressor shelter must have an easy access and exit. 
There must be enough space to allow the operating personnel to walk safely around the 
machines. They must have clear visual perception and access to, among others, valves, 
instruments, measurement instruments, and switches. In fully covered compressor 
shelters adequate ventilation must be arranged in case of hazardous gaseous leakages. 
Also a sufficient amount of doors and stairs must be provided in case of emergencies. 
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(Piping Engineering 2018) In addition, devices measuring gas concentration and fire 
detectors are required in compressor shelters. 
Also maintenance requirements must be taken into account when compressor shelter is 
designed. During a maintenance removal of the main components is generally done by 
cranes, and therefore the design of the shelter must take into account the use of various 
cranes such as the EOT (Electrically operated travelling crane) or HOT crane (Hand 
operated travelling crane). (Piping Engineering 2018) 
5.2 Properties of hydrogen 
In order to fully understand the simulations of this study some general properties of 
hydrogen are explained in this section. Hydrogen is the lightest of all gases and it is a 
colourless, odourless, and highly flammable gas. Even 0.02 mJ energy is enough to 
ignite a hydrogen-air mixture (Lautkaski 1997) whereas for hydrocarbons MIE is higher 
(from 0.2 mJ and higher). (explosionsolutions 2019). The flammability limit of 
hydrogen is between 4 and 75.6 volume per cent in the air which is really wide in 
comparison with hydrocarbons.  In general, a leakage of compressed high pressure 
hydrogen can create so much static charge that the leakage may ignite immediately. A 
static charge, spark, hot surface, and flame ignite hydrogen easily. (Työterveyslaitos 
2017) Since hydrogen is lighter than air, it starts to rise after a while. Because of the 
very wide flammability limit of hydrogen, a wide flammable vapour cloud of hydrogen 
is formed. Flammable hydrogen vapour cloud can be formed especially in fully or 
partially enclosed spaces or in the congested process area. In open spaces it is more 
likely that hydrogen is dissipating preventing the formation of flammable vapour cloud. 
Hydrogen causes high pressure in case of VCE because of the fast chemical kinetics, 
high molecular diffusivity and its high reactivity; it burns explosively (Bjerketvedt et al. 
1997). Table 5 shows the flammability properties of hydrogen. 
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Table 5 Combustion properties of hydrogen. 
 Hydrogen Reference 
Minimum ignition energy 
(MIE) 
0.02 mJ 
 
Lautkaski 1997 
Auto ignition temperature 
(AIT) 
560 °C 
 
Työterveyslaitos 2017 
Lower Flammability limit 
Upper Flammability limit 
LFL = 4 vol%  
UFL = 75.6 vol%  
 
Työterveyslaitos 2017 
Heat reaction per unit 
volume, Hst 
3.06 MJ/m3  
 
Lautkaski 1997 
Stoichiometric fraction in air 30 vol%  
 
HySafe 2019 
Maximum burning rate 3.5 m/s  
 
Lautkaski 1997 
Maximum flame speed 28 m/s  
 
Lautkaski 1997 
Sound velocity in normal 
temperature and pressure (20 
C, 101325 Pa) 
1294 m/s HySafe 2019 
 
5.3 Defining the case 
A hydrogen flange leak of the piston compressor and the subsequent hydrogen VCE 
were modelled with FLACS. In FLACS, the leakage was simulated with a dispersion 
scenario and the VCE was simulated with a gas explosion scenario. The work steps in 
this study were:  
1. Creating 3D geometry with MicroStation V8i program 
2. Defining dispersion scenarios with CASD pre-processor to simulate leakages 
where the key factor was creating the right weather conditions 
3. Simulating leakage scenarios in FLACS and, based on the results, selecting 
worst case scenario for simulating vapour cloud explosions  
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4. Building vapour cloud explosion scenarios with CASD pre-processor. The 
purpose was to investigate the effect of different ignition point locations on the 
destructive nature of the explosion 
5. Simulating explosion scenarios and selecting worst case scenario in each model 
The scenario which caused the most significant consequences (e.g. the largest vapour 
cloud and highest overpressures) was selected as a worst case scenario.  Certain 
parameters such as release rate and flange orifice size were kept constant, but weather 
conditions, wind directions, and ignition points varied between different scenarios. By 
simulating the dispersion scenarios the propagation of a vapour cloud was followed as 
well as the volume and mass of a flammable vapour cloud could be defined. By 
simulating the explosion of this vapour cloud, overpressure effects on selected monitor 
points could be defined.  
5.3.1 Preparation of a 3D model 
In this study, 3D CAD geometry was created in MicroStation v8i software and imported 
to the FLACS CASD pre-processor. FLACS can define the volume blockage ratio (or in 
other words the porosity of the objects) only for the box and cylindrical objects. In 
special cases, ellipsoids, truncated cones and convex polyhedrons can be also defined as 
an obstacle but there are certain limitations as they are “not contributing to turbulence 
and drag force”. (Gexcon AS 2018) 3D CAD geometry required large-scale editing, as 
part of the objects had to be edited manually to be defined by FLACS as obstacles. 
Figure 13 shows a modelling area made with MicroStation v8i. 
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Figure 13. 3D model of the modelled case in MicroStation v8i. 
When 3D CAD geometry was completed in MicroStation, it was then divided into 
smaller files in order to speed up the importing and to create three different models. The 
FLACS modelling was performed by using three different models in which the volume 
blockage ratio varied (compressor shelter, environment and terrain remained the same). 
The aim was to study the effects of a volume blockage ratio on dispersion and explosion 
overpressure. Three different models were named Model1, Model2 and Model3 and are 
shown in Figures 14. A modelling area of the Model1 was compressor shelter, Model2 
modelling area was a diesel producing unit and control building, and Model3 modelling 
area was total modelling area shown in Figure 14.  
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Figure 14. Three different models with a different volume blockage ratio. a) Model1 
(compressor shelter), b) Model2 (diesel producing units and control building), and c) 
Model3 (Total modelling area). 
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The 3D CAD geometries were imported to a separate pre-processor program called 
CASD (Computer Aided Scenario Design) before simulations are done (Gexcon AS 
2018). In this program, the aimed scenario is created (e.g. vapour cloud explosion, 
dispersion and ventilation, pool fire etc.). In addition, the geometry is added and 
computational mesh (grid) is prepared.  
5.3.2 Preparation of a computational mesh and monitor points 
For the iterative simulation process, the computational area must be divided into small 
cells; hence computational mesh has to be made. The governing equations are then 
solved in each and every cell to obtain predictions for the local values of hydrogen 
concentration and pressure (among others). For FLACS simulation, the mesh must 
consist of cubical and rectangular cells that are horizontally and vertically aligned in the 
x, y and z directions of the obstacles. The cell size of a grid is a crucial factor since it 
affects the accuracy of the simulation results and duration of the simulation (wall clock 
time). Too large cell size gives a rough indicative result, while too small cell size leads 
to a too long simulation and tends to over predict the results (e.g. in vapour cloud 
explosion simulations burning velocities are over predicted when cell size is smaller 
than 1 to 2 centimetres). (Gexcon AS 2018) The cell size should be selected by the 
relative to the geometry and domain length-scales and the leaking substance; the more 
reactive substance the smaller cell size should be used. 
The size of the computational mesh (cell count) itself is primarily influenced by the 
simulation geometry. In FLACS, there must be terrain in the geometry where the 
bottom of the grid is placed. The grid must not exceed the boundaries of the terrain as 
FLACS assumes that everything outside the terrain is an empty space.  
FLACS has a pre-processor porosity calculation program ‘Porcalc’ that can detect 
objects smaller than the cell size of mesh (e.g. pipes) as obstacles. ‘Porcalc’ has built-in 
information: “Porcalc reads the grid and geometry files and assigns volume and area 
porosities to each rectangular grid cell” (Gexcon AS 2018). In the simulations, the 
porosity field represents the local congestion and confinement which allows smaller 
objects to be considered as obstacles. (Gexcon AS 2018) Porcalc automatically transfers 
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the objects to the nearest line of mesh. This can cause unwanted flaws to the 3D 
geometry such as gaps between walls. For this reason, when drawing up mesh, it is 
important that the largest objects (such as walls, ceilings, and large process equipment) 
are aligned with the grid lines before using the ‘Porcalc’ function. For smaller objects, it 
is not as critical set to align with grid line unless the geometry does not have many 
objects. (Gexcon AS 2018) 
The hexahedral mesh is created in the CASD pre-processor using the ‘Quick Grid’ 
function. First, the size of the grid (in metres) is determined by setting the minimum and 
maximum values for x, y, and z directions and the simulation volume was determined as 
7 959 060 m
3
. Minimum and maximum values determine where the grid begins and 
where it ends. It is possible to choose whether to use a uniform cell size in all directions, 
or to determine the individual cell sizes for each coordinate direction. 
Creating mesh varies between different simulation scenarios. In this study, two 
scenarios were used: dispersion and ventilation scenario and VCE scenario. The same 
values of the computational mesh size (minimum and maximum values) and cell size 
were used for both scenario settings. The cell size was selected to be 1.5 metres, which 
is the recommended value for large geometries where the leakage contains a highly 
reactive substance (hydrogen in this study). In Appendix 1 a different cell sizes were 
compared and the test results showed that the cell size have a major impact on the 
results. 
For the dispersion and ventilation scenario, the grid was modified, whereby both the 
cubical and the rectangular cells were present. Towards further away from the 
compressor shelter i.e. less interesting areas, the edge cells were strengthened to make 
the simulation effective enough. In addition, the grid was made denser around the 
leakage point; this function ensures that the leaking gas in the simulation is not initially 
diluted. The editing of a grid in dispersion and ventilation scenario ensures that the 
simulation can be done in a reasonable time and results are reliable. In a VCE scenario, 
it is essential that the cell size is equal in all directions and in the cubical shape. Figure 
15 shows the grids for two different scenarios. 
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Figure 15. Grid differential in a) dispersion simulation and b) vapour cloud explosion. 
The interesting variables predicted in FLACS such as pressure, temperature and volume 
ratio are simulated in every simulation cell, but in order to store data in specific 
locations monitor points must be defined by the user prior to the simulation.  According 
to the instructions of Gexcon AS (2018), the monitor points should be placed according 
to the mesh and not according to geometry. 
In this study, the same monitor points were used in both dispersion and gas explosion 
scenarios. Depending on the scenario, different variables were selected to be saved. In 
total 25 different monitor points were used and their locations are shown in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16. Location of the monitor points. The points were kept constant throughout the 
whole modelling work. 
In order to make 2D or 3D contour plots of the desirable variables, the user defines 
‘Single field 3D output’ in FLACS. The number of saved variables should be optimized 
with regards the file size and computer performance. Table 6 lists the saved variables 
used. 
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Table 6. Selected variables for monitor points and contour plots for two different 
scenarios. 
Scenario Monitor points  Contour plots 
Dispersion and ventilation Fuel mole fraction 
(FMOLE [m3/m3]) 
Pressure (P [bar(g)]) 
Velocity value (UVW 
[m/s]) 
Fuel mass fraction (FUEL 
[-]) 
Fuel mole fraction 
(FMOLE [m
3
/m
3
]) 
Velocity vector (VVEC 
[m/s]) 
Equivalence ratio (ER [-]) 
Vapour cloud explosion Drag value (DRAG [Pa]) 
Fuel mole fraction 
(FMOLE [m
3
/m
3
]) 
Pressure (P [bar(g)]) 
Combustion product mass 
fraction (PROD [-]) 
Temperature (T [K]) 
Velocity value (UVW 
[m/s]) 
Fuel mass fraction (FUEL 
[-]) 
Mach number value 
(MACH [-]) 
Pressure impulse (PIMP 
[Pa*s]) 
Density (RHO [kg/m3]) 
Fuel mole fraction 
(FMOLE [m3/m3]) 
Pressure (P [bar(g)]) 
Combustion product mass 
fraction (PROD [-]) 
Velocity vector (VVEC 
[m/s]) 
Maximum pressure 
(PMAX [bar(g)]) 
 
5.3.3 Defining boundary conditions for the dispersion scenarios 
The modelling initiated with defining boundary conditions for the hydrogen dispersion 
scenarios. In dispersion simulations different weather conditions (Pasquill atmospheric 
stability classes shown in Table 7) and wind directions were taken into account. Pasquill 
atmospheric stability class is a method for classifying the amount of turbulences in the 
atmosphere (Gexcon AS 2018).  
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Table 7. Pasquill stability classes. 
Stability class Type Occurence 
A Very unstable Weather conditions with 
a significant vertical 
mixing. Can occur during 
sunny days, when the 
ground heating causes 
the strong movements of 
an upward convected air. 
(Ponchaut et al. 2016) 
B Unstable 
C Slightly unstable 
D Neutral Cloudy weather. Can 
occur both day and night 
time. (Ponchaut et al. 
2016) 
E Slightly stable Usually at night time. 
The ground cools down 
due to radial heat transfer 
to the atmosphere. As a 
result, stable density 
stratification is formed in 
the atmosphere and 
turbulence decreases. 
(Ponchaut et al. 2016) 
F  Stable 
 
In this study, the 5D and 2F were chosen as weather types where numbers 5 and 2 
represent wind velocities metres per seconds (m/s). The 5D weather condition 
represents the average atmospheric conditions in southern Finland and 2F weather 
condition corresponds to the most unfavourable situation spreading. Table 8 shows 
more detailed weather conditions for 2F and 5D in this study. 
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Table 8. Properties of 5D and 2F weather conditions in this study. 
Parameter Weather condition 
5D 2F 
Wind velocity 5 m/s 2 m/s 
Outside-air temperature +15 C + 15 C 
Outside-air relative 
humidity 
70 % 70 % 
Atmospheric stability class D (neutral) F (stable) 
 Weather condition 
represents the average 
atmospheric conditions in 
Southern Finland. 
Weather condition 
corresponds to the most 
unfavourable situation 
spreading. The mixing of 
air with fuel is minor. It is 
a typical weather condition 
during clear nights or 
winter days.   
 
South-westerly, southerly, and easterly winds were chosen as the wind directions. The 
South-westerly wind is a dominant wind direction in the modelled region, the southerly 
and easterly winds were considered as the most unfavourable directions for hydrogen 
spreading with respect to the surrounding process area. Total of six dispersion 
simulations were made for each model in which the weather conditions and wind 
directions varied. 
With the defined atmospheric conditions and wind directions the boundary conditions of 
a simulation domain were determined. In dispersion simulation, the boundary conditions 
can be set automatically using the Wind Wizard function. This determines the wind 
condition type for modelling. The function determines the wind direction, wind speed, 
air temperature, Pasquill class, ground roughness, and boundary condition. Wind speeds 
were determined according to weather types by 5 m/s and 2 m/s. The temperature was 
selected to be 15 °C and Pasquill to neutral (D) and stable (F). Ground roughness was 
selected to be 1 metre, which is a common value for the area with regular large objects. 
The boundary condition was Nozzle formulation, which is the best suited for a porous 
area with many different objects (Gexcon AS 2018). 
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After defining the boundary conditions, the leakage was determined. FLACS simulates 
a leakage as a gas outlet that begins at a user-defined leakage point and spreads within 
the computation area. In CASD, the leakage is determined by the Leakage Wizard 
function, which automatically adjusts the leakage. A leakage can be defined to occur 
either from a specific point (within a single grid cell) or an area leakage (leakage covers 
multiple grid cells) (Gexcon AS 2018). In this study, the leakage was determined to 
occur within a single cell at the flange joint of the compressor’s pressure face (1.5 
metres from ground level). Table 9 lists the parameters which were used to set the 
leakage.  
Table 9. Parameters and values for jet leakage in 'Leakage Wizard' -function. 
Parameter Jet leakage values for dispersion and 
ventilation simulation scenarios 
Gas type Hydrogen 
Volume (equipment) [m
3
] 350.0*
 
Pressure (equipment) [bar(g)] 115.0  
Temperature (equipment) [°C] 120.0  
Atmospheric temperature [°C] 15.0  
Nozzle diameter [m] 0.028  
Discharge coefficient [-] 0.85 
Start time [s] 0.0  
* The volume is based on a 15 min hydrogen leak rate.  
Based on calculation done with PHAST previously, it has been shown that in the worst 
case situation a leakage, from the hole with a diameter of 28 millimetres, can leak at the 
same velocity as flow velocity. The duration of 15 minutes is an estimate during which 
operators are expected to notice a weakened flow and locate the leakage. 
The volume of the leaking device (i.e. compressor) was calculated according to the 
leakage rate, the density of the leaking fuel (hydrogen) and duration as seen in Equation 
2. 
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𝑉 =  
ṁ 𝑡
𝜌
=  
2.78 
𝑘𝑔
𝑠  ∙ 900 𝑠
7.155
𝑘𝑔
𝑚3
= 350 𝑚3 
In which  
V is the volume of the equipment [m
3
] 
ṁ is the mass flow rate [kg/s] 
t is the duration time [s] 
ρ is the density [kg/m
3
] 
(2) 
The density at the rupture point, ρ, was calculated by ideal gas Equation using hydrogen 
molar mass as seen in Equation 3 
 
𝜌 =  
𝑃𝑀
𝑅𝑇
=  
11601325 
𝑁
𝑚2
∙ 2.016
𝑘𝑔
𝑘𝑚𝑜𝑙
8314 
𝑁𝑚
𝐾𝑘𝑚𝑜𝑙
∙ 393.15 𝐾
= 7.155 
𝑘𝑔
𝑚3
 
In which  
P is the pressure [N/m
2
] 
M is the molar mass [kg/kmol] 
R is the universal gas constant [Nm/K/kmol] 
T is the temperature [K] 
(3) 
With input results listed in Table 9, the Leakage Wizard calculated the values of leakage 
output rate, which are listed in Table 10. 
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Table 10. Parameters and values for leakage outlet in 'Leakage Wizard' -function. 
Parameter Leakage outlet value for dispersion and 
ventilation simulation scenarios 
Area [m
2
] 0.000625
 
Velocity [m/s] 805.566  
Mass flow [kg/s] 2.78  
Relative turbulence intensity [-] 0.1  
Turbulence length scale [-] 0.002822  
Temperature [°C] 97.272  
Start time [s] 0.0  
Duration [s] 900  
 
The total leakage area is user defined and In this study, the leakage area was determined 
to cover the volume inside the computational mesh (see Figure 17). 
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Figure 17. Total leakage area of modelling area. 
In addition to leakage scenario set user defines the general simulation and output control 
values for the simulations. The defined parameters are the maximum simulation time 
(TMAX), Courant-Friedrich-Levy number based on sound velocity (CFLC), Courant-
Friedrich-Levy number based on fluid flow velocity (CFLV), MODD time-step 
(MODD), and parameters determine how often the field plot data (NPLOT) and 
simulation data (DTPLOT) are written. In addition, the simulation start time (TSART), 
the minimum time (TMIN), the last time step, the load number and the scale can be 
determined separately if needed. The set parameters for simulation and output control 
for dispersion simulations are listed in Table 11. 
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Table 11. Simulation and output control values for dispersion simulations. 
Property Value for Dispersion and ventilation 
TMAX 900 s 
CFLC 10 
CFLV 1 
MODD 10 
NPLOT -1 
DTPLOT 10 s 
 
CFLC and CFLV values determine the time steps in the simulation for the sound wave 
(CFLC) and fluid flow (CFLV). Each time step is selected so that the sound velocity 
and fluid flow can proceed only a limited distance. (Gexcon AS 2018) The values 
CFLC 10 and CFLV 1 were used (values were automatically proposed in a FLACS Run 
Simulation), the higher values resulted in unstable simulation and thus too high mass 
residual error. Therefore the values had to be lowered to 10 and 1. 
5.3.4 Defining boundary conditions for the gas explosion scenarios 
Gas explosion scenarios in each model were based on the dispersion simulation scenario 
which gave the largest flammable stoichiometric gas cloud (more detailed discussion 
about the results is presented in chapter 6). The boundary conditions for gas explosion 
scenarios were based on the dispersion scenarios. Instead of the Nozzle formulation the 
boundaries based on Euler Equation were used which are commonly used in gas 
explosion simulations (Gexcon AS 2018).  
The simulation and output control values differ in some extent from the dispersion 
modelling. Values for simulation and output control are shown in Table 12. 
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Table 12 Simulation and output control for gas explosion scenarios. 
Property Value for Vapour cloud explosion 
TMAX -1 s 
CFLC 5 
CFLV 0.5 
MODD 1 
NPLOT 25 
DTPLOT 0.025 s 
TMIN 1.5 s 
 
In a gas explosion scenario, the maximum time is not usually determined (set value -1), 
but the simulation stops automatically when ignition occurs and either of two criteria is 
met (Gexcon AS 2018): 
1. At least 90% of the fuel is burnt or has left the calculation area 
2. At least 50% of the fuel is burnt or has left the calculation area and the mean 
pressure value is negative 
In this study, the default values for CFLC and CFLV were used. The CFLC time step 
limit is generally a determinant factor at an early stage of the explosion when flow rates 
and combustion rates are still low. While the value of CFLV is generally a determinant 
factor after of an explosion, when flow rates and burning rates are high. (Gexcon AS 
2018) Additionally, a minimum time (TMIN) was determined. In practice, the TMIN 
means that the simulation does not stop automatically before the set value is reached. 
For this work, the minimum simulation time was selected 1.5 seconds. 
For the explosion scenario, flammable gas cloud was determined according to the 
dispersion simulations. The flammable vapour cloud was assumed to be pure hydrogen 
gas and in FLACS the properties of hydrogen are already defined.  It is possible to 
identify toxic substances in the gas mixture. In this study it was assumed that no toxic 
substances are present. 
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The location and size of a formed vapour cloud were determined according to results 
obtained from dispersion simulations. Figures 18, 19 and 20 show the location and size 
of three different clouds of vapour cloud explosion simulations. A more detailed 
description of these vapour clouds (e.g. size, volume, and mass) is described in chapter 
6. 
 
Figure 18. Volume (8200 m
3
) of a hydrogen vapour cloud in Model1 (20m x 40m x 
10.5m and mass of a flammable vapour cloud: 160 kg). 
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Figure 19. Volume (7500 m
3
) of a hydrogen vapour cloud in Model2 (19m x 46.5m x 
8.5m and mass of a flammable vapour cloud: 140 kg). 
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Figure 20. Volume (7400 m
3
) of a hydrogen vapour cloud in Model3 (18.5m x 47.5m x 
8.5m and mass of a flammable vapour cloud: 138 kg). 
Additionally pressure relief panels were used to represent the walls and roof of a 
compressor shelter. Pressure relief panels represent the situation where the walls ‘opens’ 
during an explosion as the ‘real thick walls’ are assumed in FLACS to withstand the 
explosion. Panels were edited in a way that they represent the walls and roof of a 
compressor shelter, which are all the same and shelter does not have lightweight wall. In 
vapour cloud explosion simulation FLACS assumes, if no pressure relief panels are 
used, that normal walls stand up during an explosion and therefore the generated 
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overpressures are much higher and do not represent the realistic values. In real, the 
walls of compressor shelter are so light that they will not withstand in case of an 
explosion. This is why the thick walls were replaced with pressure relief panels.  
The wall and roof of the compressor shelter consist of corrugated sheet made of 
stainless steel. Figure 21 shows the walls and roof of compressor shelter in 
MicroStation (a) and pressure relief panels (b). 
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Figure 21. Walls and roof of a compressor shelter in MicroStation v8i (a) and in CASD 
(b). The size of the compressor shelter is 19 x 40 metres and the height is 13 metres. 
The compressor shelter is open at bottom: side and back walls are 1.2 metres off the 
ground for ventilation. Shelter also has small (0.5 m) venting openings in the upper 
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walls (except the front wall). However, these vent openings did not print in CASD as 
the wall shape was too special shaped. Therefore it was made a conservative assumption 
that compressor shelter has ventilation only at the bottom. In the explosion modelling it 
was assumed that all the walls will fall at the same time.  
In this study, the ’unspecified’ active panel for walls and roof was selected. The relief 
panel opening pressure difference it was set to be 0.1 bar(g). The pressure value was 
chosen based on the effects of overpressure on structures and buildings (Casal 2008), 
where the effect of 0.1 bar overpressure is in some extent damage to the steel structures 
of the buildings. It should be pointed out that in this study panels are not represented as 
a precaution but their purpose is only to represent the breaking of the shelter walls and 
roof during an explosion. The porosity value before the explosion was determined to be 
zero (fully non-porous) and after the explosion one (the walls have completely yielded). 
Panels can be determined a weight of kilogram per square metre. If the weight of the 
panel is set to 0 kg/m
2
, then in the simulation FLACS assumes that the wall is so light 
that the mass forces can completely be ignored. The weight of the panels was assumed 
to be 10 kg/m
2
, since they are made of steel. For the panels, a dimensionless drag 
coefficient needs to be set Drag coefficient is used when modelling the attraction force 
of the panel to fluid. The value was set to 2, which is the recommended value in 
FLACS. 
5.3.5 Running the models 
When the scenario definition was ready in CASD, then the simulation was performed in 
a separate simulation program called FLACS Run Manager. It is possible to follow 
simulation results in Run Manager with simulation Plot and Log file (as seen in Figure 
22). However, more detailed results can be followed in a separate pre-processor called 
Flowvis. In Flowvis it is possible to visualize the results for example based on graphs, 
2D plots and 3D plots. The results presented in this study are done by Flowvis 5. 
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Figure 22. Log file and Plot in FLACS Simulation Run Manager. 
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6 RESULTS 
The aim of chapter 6 is to present and discuss the results obtained from the dispersion 
simulations and vapour cloud explosion simulations. The purpose was to find out at 
which modelling conditions worst case scenario is formed.  
6.1 Dispersion simulations 
The criteria for the worst-case hydrogen vapour cloud in this study were the largest 
cloud volume between the flammability limits and the largest mass of a flammable 
vapour cloud. At each scenario different weather conditions were performed.  
FLACS evaluates the flammable vapour cloud according to a special equivalent 
stoichiometric gas cloud. It is common to use stoichiometric vapour clouds in worst 
case scenarios but most of them are however too conservative and can lead to 
overestimated results. The specific equivalent stoichiometric vapour clouds, Q8 and Q9 
that are used in FLACS, are less conservative options as they are smaller scaled clouds 
with high reactivity (compared with other conservative gas clouds). The idea is that any 
explosive effects of a non-homogeneous VCE can be estimated for a smaller vapour 
cloud which has the stoichiometric concentration. At this kind of vapour cloud the 
reactivity is high and VCE occurs as detonation. (Hansen et al. 2013) 
The Q8 equivalent stoichiometric vapour cloud takes into account the volume expansion 
of vapour cloud. The Q8 cloud formula is shown in Equation 4 (Hansen et al. 2013). 
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𝑄8 =  
Σ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 ∙ 𝐸
𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
In which  
Q8 is the equivalent stoichiometric vapour cloud [m
3
] 
𝛴VolumeFuel is the overall flammable volumes of the grid inside 
the gas monitor region [m
3
] 
E is the volume expansion of the actual mixture 
Emax is the maximum expansion of the mixture 
(4) 
Q8 is best suited for situations where the burning rate is of a little importance for the 
stoichiometric cloud. Such situations are for example the formation of a large vapour 
cloud in a fully enclosed space (ventilation is non-existent), or situations where 
combustion causes rapid flame speed (e.g. DDT) and the unburned gas have no time to 
burst into flame during combustion. (Hansen et al. 2013) 
The Q9 cloud is a less conservative option that takes into account also the laminar 
burning rate. Therefore, the Q9 cloud is best suited for areas with ventilation. The Q9 
cloud scales a non-homogeneous vapour cloud into a smaller stoichiometric vapour 
cloud that is expected to give similar explosion loads as the original cloud. The Q9 
cloud formula is shown in Equation 5 (Hansen et al. 2013) 
 
 
𝑄9 =  
Σ 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙 ∙ 𝑆 ∙ 𝐸
(𝑆 ∙ 𝐸)𝑚𝑎𝑥
 
In which  
Q9 is the equivalent stoichiometric vapour cloud [m
3
] 
𝛴VolumeFuel is the overall flammable volumes of the grid inside 
the gas monitor region [m
3
] 
S is the laminar burning velocity for the actual concentration 
(5) 
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E is the volume expansion of the actual mixture  
Smax is the maximum laminar burning velocity 
Emax is the maximum expansion of the mixture 
In this study, the selected stoichiometric cloud was originally Q9 because it is the 
recommended and mostly used cloud type by FLACS users. In addition, the compressor 
shelter is not an enclosed area. This was thought to have a significant effect on the 
laminar flame rate and for that reason the Q9 cloud was selected. However, the 
overpressure results of explosion simulations seemed to be too low. After examining the 
results more closely and discussing with Gexcon the cloud type was selected to be Q8. 
The comparison of these two cloud types is shown in more detailed in Appendix 2. 
The more conservative Q8 cloud is better suited for the studied area since the hydrogen 
vapour at the flammability limits fills the compressor shelter. In addition, hydrogen is 
also a reactive fuel with a maximum laminar velocity of 2.85 m/s that makes it possible 
to form DDT. In the following sections results obtained in dispersion simulations are 
discussed separately. 
6.1.1 Model1 - Compressor shelter 
The dispersion simulation of Model1 was performed in an area where the volume 
blockage ratio was formed by the compressor shelter with equipment inside. Figure 23 
shows the volume blockage ratio at height of 1.5 metres.  
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Figure 23. Volume blockage ratio (lilac) in Model1 at height of 1.5 metres. 
The set duration for the dispersion simulations (15 minutes) was not reached due to the 
long simulation times. The simulations for all scenarios were interrupted when they had 
reached their steady-state conditions (maximum values for pressure, flammable material 
(fuel), and leakage velocity). Figure 24 shows the general log simulation results for six 
different scenarios.  
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Figure 24. Dispersion simulation results in general simulation log files in different 
scenarios: a. 5D south-westerly wind direction, b. 5D southerly wind direction, c. 5D 
easterly wind direction, d. 2F south-westerly wind direction, e. 2F southerly wind 
direction, and f. 2F easterly wind direction. A red line describes pressure, a green line 
the leakage fuel amount, and blue line the leakage rate. 
As can be concluded from Figure 24, the maximum leakage amounts were reached in 
about 150 seconds. In general, in simulation log files, the amount of fuel (green line), 
pressure (red line), and leakage rate (blue line) were measured. It is very important to 
take into account that the amount of fuel measured in a simulation log file is “as a 
function of time for a standard gas monitor region (covering the same volume as the 
complete computational domain, i.e. the closed cube)” the values remain the same 
during the simulations and they are corresponding the initial value of flammable 
(Gexcon AS 2018). For gas explosion simulations, the amount of fuel was measured 
with the mass of a flammable vapour cloud. It measures the mass of flammable material 
ignoring the mass of air or oxygen. The mass of a flammable vapour cloud together with 
the volume of the stoichiometric vapour cloud over a time, are shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 25. Volume-time plot of an equivalent stoichiometric vapour cloud (1.) and mass 
of a flammable vapour cloud (2.) in different scenarios. 
As shown in Figure 25, both the maximum stoichiometric vapour cloud volume of 2800 
m
3
 (about 20m x 40m x 10,5m) and the mass of a flammable vapour cloud of 160 kg 
were reached in the 2F easterly wind scenario at about 100 seconds. Two results (Q8 
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and mass) are clearly in line with each other. Figure 26 shows the cloud dispersion 
range at 100 seconds at the height of 1.5 metres and presented from the side (YZ 
direction). The dispersion of a vapour cloud is shown in more detail in Appendix 3 
which shows the volume fraction versus time. In the dispersion scenario in Model1 the 
highest values for Q8 and mass of a flammable vapour cloud were the biggest at the 
scenario of 2F easterly wind. Therefore it was chosen for further VCE simulations 
(described in more detail in section 6.2). 
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Figure 26. Hydrogen volume fraction (4-22 vol%) in the compressor shelter at 100 
seconds with 2F weather condition and easterly wind direction. 
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6.1.2 Model2 – Diesel producing units and control building 
The dispersion simulation of Model2 was performed in an area where the volume 
blockage ratio was formed by the diesel producing units and control building at the 
heights of 1.5 metres as shown in Figure 27. 
 
Figure 27. Volume blockage ratio (lilac) in Model2 at height of 1.5 metres. 
As in Model1, the dispersion simulation set time duration (15 min) in Model2 was not 
reached. Dispersion simulations were initially performed under both weather conditions 
(2F and 5D) with a south-westerly wind direction (dominant wind direction at the 
refinery). Based on the results obtained, the weather type with higher values (the Q8 and 
mass of a flammable vapour cloud) was then selected and ran with two other wind 
directions. Figure 28 shows the volumes of equivalent stoichiometric vapour clouds and 
flammable masses for the 5D different leakage scenarios and the 2F scenario. 
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Figure 28. Volume-time plot of an equivalent stoichiometric vapour cloud (1.) and mass 
of a flammable vapour cloud (2.) in different scenarios. 
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As in Model1, Model2 shows that the volume curves of the stoichiometric vapour cloud 
follow the mass curves of the flammable vapour cloud. Figure 28 shows that worst case 
scenario is the 5D south-westerly wind scenario with a stoichiometric volume of about 
7500 m
3
 (about 19 m x 46.5 m x 8.5 m) and a flammable vapour cloud mass of about 
140 kg which was reached in 130 seconds. This (5D) can be explained by the fact that a 
higher wind velocity blows more hydrogen gas into the process area where it is not 
easily evaporated but captured (if compared with Model1). The stoichiometric cloud 
volume of Model2 is smaller than for Model1. This is due to the volume blockage ratio, 
which is lower for Model1 and therefore the vapour cloud is slightly more spread out 
than in Model2. When looking at hydrogen in the volumetric fraction amount state 
(Figure 29) it is found that also the concentrations are lower for models. 
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Figure 29. Hydrogen volume fraction (4-22 vol%) in compressor shelter at 100 seconds 
with 5D weather condition and south-westerly wind direction. 
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As can be seen in Figure 29 the amount of hydrogen volume fraction is smaller than in 
Model1. This can be assumed to be due to a flammable vapour cloud mass of less than 
20 kg and a stoichiometric vapour cloud volume of less than 700 kg in Model2. The 
cloud also spreads more to the process area due to of faster wind velocity and direction. 
6.1.3 Model3 – Complete modelling area 
The dispersion simulation of Model3 was performed in an area where the volume 
blockage ratio was formed by objects within a radius of 100 metres from the compressor 
shelter. Figure 30 shows the volume blockage area of Model3 at height of 1.5 metres. 
 
Figure 30. Volume blockage ratio (lilac) in Model2 at height of 1.5 metres. 
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Due to a strict schedule, dispersion simulations were done for Model3 only for two 
different scenarios where the weather types varied (5D and 2F) and the wind was 
chosen to be a south-westerly wind. Simulations were stopped as soon as they reached 
their maximum values as seen in Figure 31. 
 
Figure 31. Dispersion simulation results in general simulation log files in different 
scenarios: a. 5D south-westerly wind direction, b. 2F south-westerly wind direction. 
Based on these two scenarios worst case scenario for Model3 was chosen. Figure 32 
shows the stoichiometric vapour cloud volume and mass of a flammable vapour cloud 
for both scenarios. 
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Figure 32. Volume-time plot of an equivalent stoichiometric vapour cloud (1.) and mass 
of a flammable vapour cloud (2.) in different scenarios. 
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As seen in Figure 32 the 5D scenario is better suited for a worst case scenario. The 
stoichiometric vapour cloud volume of 7400 m
3
 (about 18.5 m x 47.5 m x 8.5 m) and 
mass of a flammable vapour cloud of 138 kg are reached approximately in 160 seconds. 
The flammable concentration of hydrogen in a vapour cloud and the dispersion of the 
gas are seen in Figure 33. 
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Figure 33. Hydrogen volume fraction (4-22 vol%) in compressor shelter at 160 seconds 
with 5D weather condition and south-westerly wind direction. 
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The concentration of hydrogen in Model3 is more like Model2 than Model1. Model2 
and Model3 are similar; the results from these two models differed from each other due 
to the volume blockage ratio (larger in Model3). This resulted that Model2 had a bigger 
stoichiometric vapour cloud volume and mass of flammable gas.  
6.2 Vapour cloud explosion simulations 
Three VCE simulations with different ignition points were run for each model. In 
Appendix 4, the effects of different ignition points in terms of overpressure are shown.  
The scenarios were set according to Table 13. The aim was to investigate the effect of 
the volume blockage ratio on the formation of overpressures in the modelling area. 
Comparison of the results was not straightforward since the vapour clouds were of 
different sizes and the initial fuel amount was different in each model. The initial fuel is 
a mass amount of fuel which FLACS calculates at the beginning of a simulation; it has a 
lot of impacts on the formation of overpressure and flame acceleration. It is basically 
the density multiplied with the available volume (total fuel region volume reduced by 
blockage volume). Table 13 lists the total volume of a calculated domain blocked 
volume (i.e. volume blockage ratio) of a calculated domain and initial fuel amounts in 
different models. The results were compared with set monitor points for the models’ 
worst case scenarios. 
Table 13. Volume of a computational domain and initial fuel amount in different 
models. 
Parameter Model1 Model2 Model3 
Total volume of a 
calculation domain 
[m
3
] 
8,219,160  8,219,160 8,219,160 
Blocked volume of 
a calculation 
domain [m
3
] 
2,003 66,204 113,067 
Initial fuel [kg] 202  186 179 
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6.2.1 Compressor shelter 
Overpressures and pressure impulses were measured using four different monitor points 
in the compressor shelter. The locations of these monitor points are shown in Figure 34. 
 
Figure 34. Monitor points inside the compressor shelter. 
Figure 35 shows the overpressure peaks in four different monitor points in different 
models.  
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Figure 35. Overpressures measured inside the monitor points. Dotted lines represent the 
Model1, solid lines the Model2, and dash lines the Model3. 
The highest overpressure peak was measured in the Model2 at monitor point 4 equalling 
4.4 bar(g) (orange solid line line). In other monitor points the overpressures were 
between 3 bar(g) and 4 bar(g) in Model2. The values similar to Model2 were achieved 
also in Model3. In Model3 the maximum value 3.7 bar(g) was achieved also at monitor 
point 4. In other monitor points the values were between 3 bar(g) and 4 bar(g) except at 
monitor point 2 where the overpressure was approximately 2.5 bar(g). In Model1, the 
lowest overpressure peaks were measured. The difference between Model1 with two 
other models is significant as the maximum overpressure for Model1 was 1.3 bar(g) 
achieved also at monitor point 4. 
The measured overpressures in Model2 and Model3 indicate a drastic discharge of 
energy and a shock wave (VCE detonates). It is essential to take into account that the 
location of the ignition point is exactly the same in both Models but the fuel region of 
Model2 is slightly bigger than in Model3. The volumes of the vapour clouds play a 
significant role between these two models as the volume blockage ratio is relatively the 
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same inside and immediately outside the compressor shelter. Figure 35 proves that 
objects have a very large effect on the flame acceleration and thus the formed blast 
wave. Model1 overpressures are significantly lower and the blast curves are the 
deflagration curve shaped. This is due the location of the ignition point which is not as 
in congested area as in Model2 and Model3. The flame acceleration is not high enough 
in Model1.  
The effect of overpressure on structures is evaluated (in addition to overpressure) by the 
pressure impulse, which takes into account the pressure pulse in relation to time. The 
pressure impulse reaches its maximum after the peak pressure. Figure 36 shows the 
pressure impulses for the compressor shelter. 
 
Figure 36. Pressure impulses inside the compressor shelter. Dotted line = Model1, solid 
line = Model2, and dashed line = Model3. 
Potential damages caused by the pressure impulses are listed in Table 14. The effects of 
pressure impulses are determined by the maximum pressure impulse and its 
overpressure effect and compared with Table 3 (see section 2.4.1).  
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Table 14. Effects of pressure impulses inside the compressor shelter in different monitor 
points (see Figure 34) and Models. 
Monitor point Parameter Model1 Model2 Model3 
1  Overpressure 
[bar(g)] 
1.3 4 3.7 
Pressure 
impulse [Pas] 
3900  3530 3445 
Effects Collapse of industrial steel frame structure, breakage 
of piping, collapse of pipe racks, heavy machinery 
damaged 
2 Overpressure 
[bar(g)] 
1.3 3.1 2.5 
Pressure 
impulse [Pas] 
5540 6080 5590 
Effects Collapse of industrial steel frame structure, breakage 
of piping, collapse of pipe racks, heavy machinery 
damaged 
3 Overpressure 
[bar(g)] 
0.8 3.38 3 
Pressure 
impulse [Pas] 
4800 4650 4000 
Effects Collapse of industrial steel frame structure, breakage 
of piping, collapse of pipe racks, heavy machinery 
damaged 
4 Overpressure 
[bar(g)] 
1.5 4.4 3.7 
Pressure 
impulse [Pas] 
4900 4770 4400 
Effects Collapse of industrial steel frame structure, breakage 
of piping, collapse of pipe racks, heavy machinery 
damaged 
 
6.2.2 Control building 
The location of the monitor point measuring overpressure effects on the control building 
is shown in Figure 37. 
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Figure 37. Monitor point of the control building. 
The predicted overpressure to the control building was maximum 0.52 bar(g) (see 
Figure 38). 
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Figure 38. Overpressures measured in the monitor points. Dotted lines = Model1, solid 
lines = Model2, and dashed lines = Model3. 
The highest overpressure peak was measured in Model1 (about 0.52 bar(g)) when in 
Model2 and Model3 the overpressure peaks were lower (about 0.27  bar(g)). The 
overpressures measured in a control building were significantly lower than those 
measured in a compressor shelter. This can be assumed to be due to the volume 
blockage ratio which is small between the ignition points and the control building 
(monitor point) in each model. This leads that there is relatively open space between 
compressor shelter and control building and the turbulence is not formed as much as it 
is in process area. Also, this can be explained by the fact that in Model1 the vapour 
cloud is much closer to the control building than in Model2 and Model3. The control 
building is very critical area as it is constantly occupied. 
When the results between compressor shelter and control room are compared, it is 
noteworthy to see how quickly the overpressures dropped. Structural damages were 
measured by a pressure impulse as shown in Figure 39. 
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Figure 39. Pressure impulses in a control building. Dotted line = Model1, solid line = 
Model2, and dashed line = Model3. 
The effects of the maximum pressure impulses are compared between models in Table 
15. The pressure impulses and overpressure peaks were compared according to Figure 3 
(see section 2.4.2). The pressure impulse curves are alike to overpressure peak curves as 
the maximum values were reached at Model1. According to Table 15, major structural 
damages to the control building are expected of all three models.  
Table 15. Effects of pressure impulses in a control building in different monitor points 
and Models. 
Monitor point Parameter Model1 Model2 Model3 
6 Overpressure 
[bar(g)] 
0.52 0.27 0.27 
Pressure 
impulse [Pas] 
1650 800 795 
Effects Major structural damage 
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6.2.3 Diesel producing unit 
Three monitor points were placed outside the compressor shelter in the process area of a 
diesel producing unit (see Figure 40). Overpressures were measured at the pipe rack 
(MP5), in the process area outside the compressor shelter (MP7) and at the distillation 
column (MP8). 
 
Figure 40. Locations of the monitor points in a process area of a diesel producing units.  
The overpressures measured in those monitor points are shown in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41. Overpressures measured in diesel producing unit. Dotted lines represent the 
Model1, solid lines the Model2, and dashed lines the Model3. 
As seen from Figure 41, for Model2 and Model3 overpressure peaks rise very quickly to 
high values; a shock wave is possible. In MP7, for Model2 the maximum overpressure 
was 2.25 bar(g) and for Model3 2.3 bar(g). The pressure increase time for both models 
is less than 30 milliseconds. Also in Model1 the highest overpressure peak was 1.2 
bar(g) has a very fast pressure increase time, about 10 milliseconds. The measured 
overpressure peaks are sufficient for destroying pipes and cable racks. There are many 
pipelines in the adjacent process area containing hydrocarbons and other hazardous 
chemicals.  
Overpressures measured near the column (MP8) increased very fast to significant 
readings (about 0.9 bar(g)) in Model1. In Model2 and Model3 the overpressure peaks 
are more alike to an ideal deflagration curve and their values are about 0.8 bar(g). The 
significantly lower value (compared with MP7) for Model2 and Model3 can be 
explained by the fact that in both models the ignition point is very near to the monitor 
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point (MP8) and therefore the flame acceleration is much smaller than what it is in the 
pipeline area and there is more open space between MP8 and compressor shelter.  
The highest measured overpressure peaks in monitor point 5 for Model1 was 0.2 bar(g) 
and for Model2 and Model3 about 0.3 bar(g). The measured highest overpressure peaks 
are not able to cause a collapse of the pipe racks but the displacement of a pipe rack and 
breakage of piping is however possible and likely to occur. Some vessels are located 
near pipe racks which may be damaged.  
Structural damages in process area were evaluated (in addition to overpressures) with 
pressure impulses shown in Figure 42. 
 
Figure 42. Pressure impulses in a control building. Dotted line = Model1, solid line = 
Model2, and dashed line = Model3. 
As seen from Figure 42, the pressure impulses are like the overpressure peak curves. 
The effects of the maximum values of pressure impulses are shown in Table 16.  
95 
 
Table 16. Effects of pressure impulses in the process area of a diesel producing units at 
different monitor points and in different Models. 
Monitor point Parameter Model1 Model2 Model3 
5 Overpressure 
[bar(g)] 
0.2 0.3 0.3 
Pressure 
impulse [Pas] 
705 1160 1280 
Effects Displacement of pipe racks, breakage of piping 
7 Overpressure 
[bar(g)] 
1.2 2.25 2.3 
Pressure 
impulse [Pas] 
3500 5090 5000 
Effects Collapse of pipe racks, failure of pipes, heavy 
machinery damaged 
8 Overpressure 
[bar(g)] 
0.9 0.8 0.8 
Pressure 
impulse [Pas] 
1560 3200 3350 
Effects Displacement of pipe rack, damage to column 
structures 
 
As seen from Table 16 the measured pressure impulses at a pipe rack (MP5) will cause 
major damage to structures. Pressure impulses in the pipeline area and at the column 
(MP8) can cause partial demolition of structures.   
When comparing the results with those measured inside the compressor shelter (MP1-
4), the resulting overpressure differences are relatively notable. Both areas have the 
features of a detonation explosion, depending on the model, and it is interesting to see 
how the ignition point affects to the formed overpressure curves. The ignition point of 
Model2 and Model3 are close to monitor point 8, when the overpressure peaks remain 
significantly lower compared with Model1. 
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6.2.4 Units producing light petrol product and lubricating oil 
The modelled area also includes two units: Unit A, which produces a light petroleum 
product and Unit B, which produces lubrication oil. Both units contain flammable 
substances such as light petroleum and hydrogen gas. Both units had one measuring 
point; MP9 for unit A and MP10 for unit B (see Figure 43). The distance between the 
compressor shelter and Unit A is about 5 metres. In Unit B it is essential to take into 
account that the unit has an own smaller scaled compressor shelter. It contains one 
piston compressor, which compress hydrogen gas.  
 
Figure 43. Location of the monitor points in a unit A and unit B. Monitor point 9 is 
located in the unit A producing light petrol and Monitor point 10 located unit B 
producing lubricating oil. 
The peak overpressures are shown in Figure 44. 
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Figure 44. Overpressures measured in unit A (MP9) and unit B (MP10). Dotted lines 
represent the Model1, solid lines the Model2, and dashed lines the Model3. 
The measured overpressures in Unit A and B remind a bit of the overpressures 
measured in a control building. In Unit A, the highest overpressure peaks were 
measured in Model1 (0.39 bar(g)). In Model2 and Model3 the pressure did not increase 
as high as in Model1 (Model2 0.25 bar(g) and in Model3 0.19  bar(g)). This is because 
of the long distance between the ignition points and the units (MPs) as well as the low 
volume blockage ration. The pressure impulses measured in the units are shown in 
Figure 45. 
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Figure 45. Pressure impulses measured in unit A (MP9) and unit B (MP10). Dotted line 
= Model1, solid line = Model2, and dashed line = Model3. 
Table 17 lists the effects of pressure impulses to the structures in Unit A and Unit B.  
Table 17. Effects of pressure impulses in the Unit A and Unit B at different monitor 
points and in different Models. 
Monitor point Parameter Model1 Model2 Model3 
9 Overpressure 
[bar(g)] 
0.39 0.25 0.19 
Pressure 
impulse [Pas] 
1360 965 920 
Effects Displacement of pipe rack, damage to structures 
10 Overpressure 
[bar(g)] 
0.15 0.11 0.09 
Pressure 
impulse [Pas] 
835 690 640 
Effects Damages to steel structures and to concrete 
structures  
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Major structural damages are expected of pressure impulses in Model1 and Model2 for 
unit A. In unit B for all models and also in unit A for Model3 the minor structural 
damages are more likely to occur. 
6.3 Discussion of the results 
When comparing all three models during the dispersion simulations, it was seen that the 
timing of overpressure peaks formation differed at each model. Table 18 lists worst case 
scenarios in dispersion simulations for the models. 
Table 18. Worst case scenarios for different models. 
Parameter Model1 Model2 Model3 
Scenario 2F easterly wind 5D south-westerly 
wind 
5D south-westerly 
wind 
Volume of a 
stoichiometric 
vapour cloud [m
3
] 
8200 7500 7400 
Mass of a 
flammable vapour 
cloud [kg] 
160 140 138 
Time [s] 100 130 160 
 
As seen from Table 18 the biggest vapour cloud was in Model1 with the highest mass of 
a flammable vapour cloud. The vapour clouds in Model2 and Model3 were very similar 
and they differed from the vapour cloud of Model1 significantly. This can be explained 
by the fact that in Model2 and Model3 the volume blockage ratio (close by compressor 
shelter) is significantly higher than in Model1.  
Before dispersion simulations were performed, it was considered that the weather type 
2F is more dangerous than the weather type 5D. It was assumed that a lower wind 
velocity will result in a bigger vapour cloud since the cloud could remain in the process 
area. However, this assumption applied only to Model1 that has the least confined area 
of the three models. As seen from the dispersion simulation results in partly confined 
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modelling areas the weather type 5D will result in a bigger vapour cloud (the mass and 
volume of the cloud). It can be assumed that a higher wind velocity spreads the cloud in 
the congested pipeline area where it is trapped inside narrow spaces.  
It is essential to take into account that in Model2 the worst case scenario for dispersion 
occurs at the dominant weather type (5D south-westerly wind) unlike in Model1. In 
Model3 there is a small uncertainty about the worst case scenario since the modelling 
was performed only for two scenarios with the dominant weather type. Reviewing the 
VCEs results for the three modelling areas it can be concluded that the overpressures 
measured at each monitor point (regardless of the models) have significant 
consequences. Domino effects are likely due to the congested process area. Table 19 
summarizes the peak overpressures and pressure impulses in each model. 
101 
 
Table 19. Worst overpressure and pressure impulse levels in different areas for Model1, 
Model2 and Model3 (LaChance et al. 2011; Casal 2008). 
 Model1 Model2 Model3 
Compressor 
shelter 
Monitor point MP4 MP4 MP4 
Overpressure  
Pressure 
impulses 
1.5 bar(g) 
4900 Pas 
4.4 bar(g) 
4770 Pas 
3.7 bar(g) 
4400 Pas 
Effects on 
people 
50% probability of fatality from lung haemorrhage 
Effects on 
structures 
Collapse of industrial steel frame structure, 
breakage of piping, collapse of pipe racks, heavy 
machinery damaged 
Control 
building 
Monitor point MP6 MP6 MP6 
Overpressure  
Pressure 
impulses 
0.5 bar(g) 
1650 Pas 
0.25 bar(g) 
800 Pas 
0.25 bar(g) 
795 Pas 
Effects on 
people 
50% probability of eardrum rupture 
Effects on 
structures 
Major structural damage 
Diesel 
producing 
unit 
Monitor point MP7 MP7 MP7 
Overpressure  
Pressure 
impulses 
1.2 bar(g) 
3500 Pas 
2.25 bar(g) 
5090 Pas 
2.3 bar(g) 
5000 Pas 
Effects on 
people 
90% probability of fatality from lung haemorrhage 
Effects on 
structures 
Collapse of pipe racks, failure of pipes, heavy 
machinery damaged 
Units A and B Monitor point MP9 MP9 MP9 
Overpressure 
Pressure 
impulses 
0.39 bar(g) 
1360 Pas 
0.25 bar(g) 
965 Pas 
0.19 bar(g) 
920 Pas 
Effects on 
people 
50% probability of eardrum rupture 
Effects on 
structures 
Displacement of pipe rack, damage to structures 
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The Table 19 summaries the worst case effects of overpressure peaks and pressure 
impulses on structures and direct effects from blast to personnel. The effects are based 
on Figure 2 and Table 3 (in chapter 2). As seen in Table 19 inside the compressor 
shelter and in the diesel producing unit the formed overpressures are very high. In each 
model it can be concluded that hydrogen VCE detonated in those areas. In overall the 
overpressure peaks, with drastic increase and high values, show that hydrogen VCE can 
occur as DDT in each model. The highest overpressure peaks were achieved in Model2 
and Model3. 
For all three models, almost a complete destruction of the compressor shelter is likely. 
Outside the compressor shelter in the process area a total destruction of buildings is 
possible. The critical building in the process area is the control building as it is 
constantly occupied. The overpressure peaks for all models can damage the control 
building significantly causing a high risk of fatalities. Process equipment and their 
structures as well as pipe racks will also be damaged because of the high overpressures. 
Additionally, fatalities are likely since the overpressure is higher than 0.7 bar(g).  
Domino effects are likely to occur due to damage of process equipment and pipelines. 
The diesel producing unit and other units contain various flammable hydrocarbons and 
chemicals that are toxic and hazardous to the environment. Fatalities are also likely due 
to flying objects such as fragments and equipment parts.  
A similar hydrogen VCE in a compressor shelter has previously been simulated with the 
PHAST (7.2) software. In PHAST, the geometry cannot be set at the same accurate 
level as in FLACS. Therefore PHAST cannot reliably simulate higher volume blockage 
ratios. It was separately calculated that the compressor shelter was filled up in less than 
five minutes and that the mass of the flammable vapour cloud was approximately 600 
kg. Conservative assumptions were used. As a result, PHAST calculated an 
overpressure of 1 bar(g) in the compressor shelter and its vicinity.  
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When these are compared with the results of FLACS, it can be seen that the vapour 
cloud is formed faster, in about 2.5 minutes (Model3), with a flammable vapour cloud 
mass of 138 kg that is 4.3 times smaller amount than a separately calculated amount for 
a PHAST simulation. In FLACS, the maximum overpressure in the compressor shelter 
was 4.4 bar(g) and in its vicinity 2.3 bar(g) giving a remarkable difference compared 
with PHAST.  
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7 CONCLUSION 
In the chemical and petrochemical industries flammable liquids and gases are constantly 
processed and thus a risk of an explosion exists. Consequences of explosions caused by 
VCEs are generally destructive to industrial areas. The most hazardous vapour cloud 
explosions occur in partly confined areas and in congested areas where the 
overpressures can rise to very high measures only in a few milliseconds. Modelling of 
partly confined areas, in particular, has been challenging as the objects in the area cause 
turbulence. Programmes suitable for modelling those areas are generally very expensive 
and require a lot of computing power. 
The main objective of this study was to simulate the partly confined hydrogen vapour 
cloud explosions in three different models with varying volume blockage ratios. The 
modelling was done with FLACS v10.8 software. Simulations were done for 
dispersions and consequently for VCEs. With dispersion simulations, the objectives 
were to estimate formed flammable vapour clouds of the flange leakage and the mass of 
a flammable vapour clouds. Consequently with the VCE simulations the aim was to 
estimate overpressure and pressure impulse peaks. Also the usability of the FLACS 
software was tested. 
7.1 Dispersion simulations 
The criteria for the worst case hydrogen vapour cloud in this study were the largest 
mass of a flammable vapour cloud and the largest flammable vapour cloud volume. For 
each scenario different weather conditions (5D and 2F) were run. FLACS evaluates the 
flammable vapour cloud according to a special equivalent stoichiometric gas cloud. The 
Q8 vapour cloud type was used as a stoichiometric gas cloud since the hydrogen vapour 
at its flammability limits fills the compressor shelter. In addition, hydrogen is also a 
reactive fuel with a fast laminar velocity which makes it possible to form a DDT. 
The simulations for all scenarios were ended when they had reached their maximum 
values for pressure, flammable material (fuel), and leakage velocity. The worst case 
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results for the dispersion simulations for Model1 with weather condition 2F easterly 
wind resulted in a vapour cloud volume of 8200 m
3
 and mass of a flammable vapour 
cloud of 160 kg. For Model2, worst case scenario occurred in weather condition 5D 
south-westerly wind with a vapour cloud volume of 7500 m
3
 and a mass of a flammable 
vapour cloud of 140 kg. For Model3, worst case scenario was in weather condition 5D 
south-westerly wind resulting in a vapour cloud volume of 1400 m
3
 and a mass of a 
flammable vapour cloud of 138 kg.   
Before dispersion simulations were performed, it was considered that 2F weather type is 
more hazardous than 5D weather type. This was based on the assumption that with 
lower wind speed the hydrogen vapour cloud would much easily got trapped in process 
area than at higher wind speed. In general, 2F as more dangerous weather condition 
applies in leakage scenarios in which the leakage material (for example hydrocarbons 
such as gasoline) is heavier than air. In such cases, the flammable vapour cloud is 
formed near to a ground level.  
In this study, the assumption applied only to Model1, which has the most open area of 
three models. However, as seen from the dispersion simulation results, in more 
congested partly confined modelling areas, 5D weather type is more dangerous.  It is 
likely that with a higher wind velocity the hydrogen gas spreads more to the congested 
pipeline area and is trapped inside the narrow spaces. 
It is essential to take into account that in Model2 worst case scenario for dispersion 
occurs at the dominant weather type, unlike in Model1. With Model3 a small 
uncertainty about worst case scenario occurs since the modelling was performed only 
for two scenarios. The vapour cloud explosions were simulated according to simulated 
worst case dispersion simulation scenarios; the results of VCEs are explained in the next 
section (7.2). 
7.2 Vapour cloud explosion simulations 
Three VCE simulations with different ignition points were modelled for each model. 
The aim was to investigate the effect of volume blockage ratio on the formation of 
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overpressures in the modelling area. Comparison of the results was not straightforward 
since the vapour clouds were of different sizes and the initial fuel amount was different 
in each model. The mass of a flammable vapour cloud had the most significant impact 
on the overpressure results. It can be said that the overpressure measured at each 
monitor point (regardless of the model) has significant consequences that can lead to the 
domino effects. The highest overpressures were measured in Model2 and Model3 inside 
the compressor shelter (monitor point MP4): Model2 4.4 bar(g) and Model3 3.7 bar(g). 
The overpressure peaks increased to significant values outside the compressor shelter 
(diesel producing unit) where the overpressure for Model2 was 2.25 bar(g) and for 
Model3 2.3 bar(g) (in monitor point MP7). For other monitor points the values were 
significantly lower. All three models showed that almost a complete destruction of the 
compressor shelter is likely. Additionally, for the control building overpressure peaks 
can damage the building significantly causing a high risk of fatalities. Cable racks are 
damaged.  
Domino effects are also likely to occur due to damage of the process equipment. The 
process area has pipe racks which may move and partially collapse due to explosion 
overpressures causing new leakages and possible damages to the nearest vessels. Unit A 
(located close to the compressor shelter) produces a light petrol product which is 
classified as a highly flammable and environmentally hazardous substance that is 
dangerous to personnel. Fatalities are likely due to explosion overpressures (over 0.7 
bar(g)), flying objects such as fragments and equipment parts, and domino effects (such 
as fires, toxic leakages and possible explosions).  
7.3 Simulation with FLACS 
FLACS software is user friendly software where the scenario build-up is relatively easy 
and clear. Also, the mandatory FLACS course, proper instructions provided by Gexcon 
and expeditious FLACS support made the use of the FLACS easier. FLACS require a 
lot of computing power which was resulted especially in a long dispersion simulation 
times. The dispersion simulations took several days and they were interrupted. With 
VCE simulations, the simulation times were significantly shorter from an hour to a 
maximum of four hours. It is important to take into account that the capacity of the 
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computer has a significant impact on the timing. To speed up the simulation time it is 
possible to run simulation with several computer cores. This function also makes it 
possible to run several simulations at the same time. In this study, the computer had four 
cores (quad-core) and dispersion simulations were singly run and were distributed to 
four cores. 
The simulation results are highly dependent on the selected cell size of computational 
mesh which is shown in appendix 1. As this study showed the smaller cell sizes the 
formed overpressures from VCEs are higher. For gas explosion scenarios, the selection 
of right equivalent stoichiometric vapour cloud is essential. The result differences 
between Q8 and Q9 vapour cloud are significant as seen from appendix 2 which 
includes the results of the Q9 vapour cloud simulation. 
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APPENDIX 1: TESTING OF A DIFFERENT CELL SIZES 
IN COMPUTATIONAL MESH 
During this study the affection of a computational mesh cell size to the hydrogen VCE 
results were tested with three different cell sizes. This modelling test was performed to a 
Model1 in which the blockage ratio was formed from compressor shelter and the 
equipment inside (see section 6.1.1). According to Gexcon AS (2018) guidance, a finer 
computational mesh for reactive gas (such as hydrogen) is recommended. However, the 
capacity of the computer has to be taken into account, as a computing network with 
more than one to two million cells can have a very long simulation time. A total of three 
hydrogen gas explosion test simulations were performed, with a cell size of 1.0 metres 
for the scenario1, 1.5 metres for the scenario2 and 2.0 metres for the scenario3 
computing network. 
The test was performed to Model1 in which the vapour cloud filled the whole 
compressor shelter (volume of cloud was 8200 m
3
). The ignition point location was the 
same for all three scenarios and it can be seen from Figure 1 together with vapour cloud. 
The total volume of computational domain in scenarios was the same as in Model1 
(8,219,160 m
3
). 
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Figure 1. Testing modelling area (Scenario2 in which mesh size is 1.5 metres). 
The overpressures and pressure impulses were examined through four monitor points 
located in the compressor shelter (same points as in section 6.2.1.). The cell sizes 
between the different scenarios were selected according to the recommended cell size 
for this study being 1.5 metres. According to that cell size 0.5 metres smaller and bigger 
cell sizes were chosen. A cell size of 1 metre (Scenario1) is recommended value for 
modelling gas explosion containing reactive gases with fast flame speed such as 
hydrogen as “the fast flames may generate pressure gradients in the flame front which 
also should be resolved” (Gexcon AS 2018). However, in this study, with a 1 metre cell 
size the computational mesh would contain over 3 million cells, which is resulting in a 
very heavy modelling file. For Model1, the simulation time can be relatively fast 
because the volume 
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blockage ratio is relatively low, but for example for Model2 the simulation time can be 
already very long. A cell size of 1.5 metres is therefore a better alternative than 1 metre. 
The number of mesh cells decreased significantly (1-2 million) and the simulation time 
was significantly reduced. A cell size of 2 metres was selected for comparison of the 
results. A cell size of 2 metres is not recommended because it is no longer able to take 
into account at the same accuracy as with the smaller cell sizes the flame velocity and 
thus the overpressure that is generated are more indicative value. A Table 1 lists for 
three scenarios a total volume of a computational domain, blocked volume of a 
calculation domain and initial fuel, which FLACS calculates at the very beginning of 
the simulations and which determine the severity of the explosion. 
Table 1. Properties calculated in FLACS in different scenarios which affects to the 
explosion results. 
Parameter Scenario1 Scenario2 Scenario3 
Total volume of a 
calculation domain 
[m
3
] 
8,219,160  8,219,160 8,219,160 
Blocked volume of 
a calculation 
domain [m
3
] 
314  424 530 
Initial fuel [kg] 205 202 204 
 
As seen from Table 1 the blocked volume of a calculated domain is different for each 
scenario. With a larger cell size the blocked volume is increasing. With an initial fuel it 
is not that straightforward. The initial fuel was not seemed to differ that much even 
though the blocked volume increased significantly. In Figure 2 the comparison of 
overpressure peaks of the three different scenarios are shown. 
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Figure 2. Overpressures in different Scenarios. Dotted lines (010100) = Scenrio1, 
Dashed lines (010200) = Scenario2, and Solid lines (010300) = Scenario3. 
As seen from Figure 2, the cell size of computational mesh affects significantly to the 
occurring time of explosion as well as to formed values of overpressure peaks. It is 
essential to take into account that with a smaller cell sized mesh it is possible that the 
results can be over predicted (Gexcon AS 2018). When comparing the overpressure 
results in Figure 47 it is seemed that in MP1 the overpressure peak is over predicted. 
The MP1 peak in other two scenarios is also giving the highest peak values but the 
difference with other monitor points are less. If ignored the MP1 of Scenario1, it is 
seemed that the overpressure values are almost exponentially decreasing as the cell size 
of computational mesh increasing. The start time of an explosion also delays as the cell 
size increases. With the test results obtained, it can be said that the cell size of a 
computational mesh is affecting significantly to the simulation results and the 
differences between cell sizes are notable. 
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APPENDIX 2: COMPARISON OF AN EQUIVALENT 
STOICHIMETRIC GAS CLOUDS Q8 AND Q9 
In Appendix 2 the comparison of equivalent stoichiometric vapour cloud was compared 
with each other. The comparison was performed to Model2. Figure 3 shows the 
differences between the volume sizes of a two different cloud type. 
 
Figure 3. Volume-time plot of an equivalent stoichiometric vapour clouds. Solid lines 
represent the Q8 cloud type and dashed lines represents the Q9 cloud type. 
As seen from Figure 3 the differences between the cloud volumes are very significant. 
In both cloud types the volume curves at different weather conditions stabilized 
approximately at the same time. However, the maximum cloud sizes for Q8 and Q9 
clouds were obtained in different weather types. In Q8 the maximum value (7500 m
3
) 
was obtained in 5D south-westerly wind direction and in Q9 the maximum value (1700 
m
3
) was obtained in 5D southerly wind direction. The major difference in these two 
cloud types is that in Q8 equivalent stoichiometric vapour cloud takes into account 
volume expansion of vapour cloud and in Q9 type also the laminar burning velocity is 
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taken into account. With the obtained maximum volumes, the following clouds were 
applied to modelling (see Figure 4). 
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Figure 4. Q8 vapour cloud (a) and Q9 vapour cloud (b) for Model2. 
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The total volume of a calculation domain was for both scenarios the same (7,959,060 
m
3
) in which the blocked volume was 66,150 m
3
. The major differences between these 
two models which affected majorly to the resulted overpressure peaks were the amount 
of the initial fuel. Since FLACS calculates the initial fuel by multiplying density with 
available volume the amount of flammable hydrogen is significantly lower in Q9 than it 
is in Q8. For Q8 the initial fuel amount was 186 kg and in Q9 the amount was only 24 
kg. This affection can be seen from the resulted overpressure peaks and pressure 
impulses shown in Figure 5. 
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Figure 5. Comparison of Q8 and Q9 overpressures (1) and pressure impulses (2).
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The overpressure peaks and pressure impulses were measured in monitor points located 
inside the compressor shelter (same as in section 6.2.1). The ignition points were the 
same for both scenarios.  
It is seen from Figure 5 that the overpressure peaks in Q9 scenarios occurred a slightly 
earlier than in Q8 scenario. The overpressure peaks were very small (less than 0.5 
bar(g)) and did not represent the values which were expected for the Model2 very 
congested area. The Q9 cloud was not enough conservatives for this study as Q8 cloud 
and after revision with Gexcon it was decided that more suitable vapour cloud type for 
this study was Q8 cloud. 
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APPENDIX 3: VOLUME FRACTIONS FOR MODEL1, 
MODEL2 AND MODEL3 
Hydrogen vapour cloud dispersion in time for Model1 (volume fraction 
4-22 vol-%) with 2F weather condition and easterly wind direction 
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Hydrogen vapour cloud dispersion in time for Model2 (volume fraction 
4-22 vol-%) with 5D weather condition and south-westerly wind 
direction 
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Hydrogen vapour cloud dispersion in time for Model3 (volume fraction 
4-22 vol-%) with 5D weather condition and south-westerly wind 
direction 
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APPENDIX 4: IGNITION POINT LOCATIONS IN 
DIFFERENT MODELS 
In this study, a total of three different scenarios were performed for each explosion 
models with varying ignition points. The locations of the ignition points were used to 
determine how the location affects the flame acceleration and thus the pressures 
generated. The following sections consider the ignition points for the different models. 
Model1 – Compressor shelter 
For Model1, the locations of the ignition points were slightly different from Model2 and 
Model3 because the size and location vapour cloud of Model1 was different (located 
entirely in the compressor shelter). The Model1 was best suited for the studying of the 
effects of room shape. The locations of the Model1 ignition points are shown in Figure 
6. 
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Figure 6. Location of ignition points (IP) in Model1. 
The IP1 location was close to a leaking compressor (at about 1 metre height), the IP2 
location was near the cloud edge and the IP3 location was quite in the centre of the 
compressor shelter, at approximately 4 metres height. The effect of the locations is seen 
in the measured overpressures as shown in Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Overpressures for different monitor points in different IPs. IP1= solid line, IP2 
= dotted line and IP3 = dashed line. 
In Figure 7, the overpressures were viewed through 10 different monitor points. The 
results show that the highest values are achieved in IP2 in monitor point MP4 (1.5  
bar(g)) . The overpressures measured in particular inside the compressor shelter varied 
greatly, simply because the flame accelerates differently depending on the location of 
the points. As mentioned in chapter 3.5 the flame must propagate as long as possible as 
a spherical form. The spherical form is more likely when the ignition point is in the 
centre of the vapour cloud as it forms in initial stage of the explosion when the flame 
front has not “wrinkled”. In addition, IP2 is located in a way that the flame front is 
significantly longer compared with the flame front from IP1 and IP3 resulting that the 
turbulence is stronger when the explosion starts from the IP2. Outside the compressor 
shelter, the curves of the different ignition points are more closely aligned. For Model1, 
IP2 was chosen as worst case scenario. 
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Model2 (diesel producing unit) and Model3 (total modelling area) 
Model2 and Model3 are similar since the gas clouds are almost the same size and the 
immediate vicinity of the compressor shelter is similar in both models. For Model2 and 
Model3 the locations of the ignition points were the same. Figure 8 shows the ignition 
points for Model2. 
 
Figure 8. Location of ignition points (IP) in Model2 and Model3. 
The IP2 and IP3 locations were outside the compressor shelter: the IP2 in the congested 
pipeline area and the IP3 at the column. The location of IP1 was inside the compressor 
shelter and was the same as the IP1 of Model1. The effect of the ignition point locations 
in Model2 and Model3 is seen in the measured overpressures as shown in Figure 9.
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Figure 9. Overpressures for different monitor points in different ignition points (IP), 
Model2 (a) and Model3 (b). IP1= solid line, IP2 = dotted line and IP3 = dashed line.
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For Model2 and Model3, it is seen that the overpressures formed in IP3 are greater than 
the overpressures formed in IP1 and IP2. The location of IP3 gives the strongest 
overpressure, as it is ideally located not in the most congested area, but is still 
surrounded by many objects that increase turbulence and give very high flame 
acceleration. The location of IP2 is in an 'over-congested' area where the distance is 
negligible, and the so-called “pocked” of unburned mixture formed between the objects 
is too small to cause flame acceleration. For IP1, located inside the compressor shelter, 
the distance between objects is too “wide” (in this context) and therefore continuous 
flame acceleration is high enough. For both Model2 and Model3 the IP3 was chosen to 
be for worst case scenario. 
